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1 Introduction
There is much evidence that workers’ concern for “fair” transactions influences their labor market 
behavior. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) suggest that fairness explains rent 
sharing and “internal labor markets,” the facts that workers’ wages are relatively more sensitive 
to a firm’s profits and relatively less sensitive to current labor market conditions than neoclassical 
theory might suggest. Bewley (1999) concludes that workers’ feelings about fairness could explain 
why firms typically lay off workers rather than reduce wages: still-employed workers would consider 
wage cuts unfair and become less productive. Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) review these and 
other empirical findings and make the case that fairness concerns play an important role in labor 
markets.
This paper makes three contributions. First, building on existing models of fairness concerns 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Charness and Rabin 2002), I develop a model of a worker’s concern for 
fairness when interacting with a firm. A crucial element of the model is that the worker judges 
fairness by contrasting the current transaction with a “reference transaction,” which is determined 
by the worker’s recent personal experience. Second, I apply the model in a simple gift-exchange 
game and show that it can explain several labor market regularities: rent sharing, persistence of a 
worker’s entry wage at a firm, insensitivity of an incumbent worker’s wage to market conditions, 
and— with the additional assumptions that the worker is loss averse and evaluates losses with 
respect to his nominal wage— downward nominal wage rigidity. While many of these phenomena 
have explanations based on repetition or reputation, the model predicts they would continue to be 
observed in settings where repetition and reputation forces are weak. The model also makes some 
novel predictions, such as that effort will be upward rigid. Third, I analyze the efficiency of the 
equilibrium under alternative assumptions about whether fairness concerns and loss aversion are 
part of the worker’s “true” preferences that are relevant for normative analysis.
Section 2 introduces the game that I study throughout the paper. The firm, which aims to 
maximize profit, offers a wage to each worker. Each worker then chooses how much effort to 
exert. To focus on the implications of the workers’ fairness preferences, I assume that contracting 
is infeasible and the exchange is one-shot. Thus, if a worker were purely self-regarding, then the 
worker would exert minimal effort regardless of the wage, so in equilibrium the firm would not hire 
the worker.
Section 2 also develops the model of fairness concerns. It is an extension of commonly used 
specifications of preferences used to explain behavior in laboratory experiments (Fehr and Schmidt
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1999, Charness and Rabin 2002). To allow the model to be applied to the transaction between 
a worker and a firm, I generalize the specification of preferences in two ways. First, I assume 
that the worker judges the fairness of a transaction not only with regard to the monetary transfer 
(i.e., the wage) but also with regard to the amount of effort exerted by the worker. That is, the 
worker judges the fairness of the transaction by comparing the gain in profit to the firm with the 
overall gain to the worker net of effort costs. Second, the actual transaction is contrasted with the 
reference transaction, a benchmark terms of exchange against which the worker views alternative 
transactions. The worker calculates his own and the firm’s “surplus payoff” as the deviation of the 
player’s actual payoff from the payoff he or she would have earned from the reference transaction. If 
the firm’s surplus payoff and the worker’s surplus payoff are equal, then the transaction is considered 
maximally fair. In contrast, the transaction is judged particularly unfair if one party’s surplus payoff 
is much larger than the other’s. The model captures the essential features of Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler’s (1986) “dual entitlement theory.” Consistent with some of Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler’s (1986) survey data and with the experimental evidence in Herz and Taubinsky (2013), I 
assume that the worker’s reference transaction (the wage and effort combination that determines 
the reference payoff) is determined by what the worker himself has recently personally experienced.
In Section 3, I study the equilibrium of this game, assuming that the worker has a strong 
concern for fairness. Because the worker is motivated by fairness, he chooses effort to equate the 
two players’ surplus payoffs. Consequently, the worker is willing to exert more effort in response to 
a higher wage: a higher wage increases the worker’s surplus payoff and reduces profit, so equating 
the surplus payoffs requires the worker to increase effort. In equilibrium, the firm offers the wage 
that induces the worker to exert the efficient level of effort. The reason is that, since the worker’s 
effort choice will ensure that the players’ surplus payoffs are equal, the firm maximizes its own 
surplus payoff by maximizing the sum of the surpluses.
The main empirical implication of the model in Section 3 is rent sharing: firms that are
more profitable for a given level of the worker’s effort— due to a higher output price or greater 
productivity— offer higher wages. In equilibrium a more profitable firm will offer a higher wage in 
order to induce the now-higher efficient level of effort. This implication is consistent with much 
evidence that more profitable firms pay higher wages to apparently identical workers (e.g., Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis 1999) and more profitable industries pay higher wages to all occupations 
(e.g., Dickens and Katz 1987).
In Section 4, I examine a two-period, repeated version of the game in order to investigate the 
dynamic implications of the worker’s fairness concerns. In this analysis, a key role is played by
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the assumption that the transaction that takes place in period 1 becomes the worker’s reference 
transaction for period 2.
Two main implications come out of the two-period model. First, workers who are paid more in 
period 1 (because they entered period 1 with a more favorable reference transaction) also end up 
getting paid more in period 2. That is because the higher pay in period 1 means that they enter 
period 2 with a more favorable reference transaction. Since the worker’s effort choice equates the 
players’ surpluses (relative to the reference transaction), the firm needs to offer a higher wage in 
order to induce the efficient level of effort. It is indeed an important empirical regularity that cohorts 
of workers who experience high entry wages continue to earn relatively high wages throughout their 
tenure at the firm (e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994, Kahn 2010).
Second, the wage of the worker who remains employed by the firm in period 2 is insensitive 
to small variations in the worker’s outside-option payoff. That is because the wage is entirely 
pinned down by the worker’s reference transaction and the efficient level of effort. Both of these are 
independent of the worker’s contemporaneous outside-option payoff. The empirical observation that 
incumbent workers’ wages are determined in an “internal labor market” (internal to the firm) and 
largely shielded by fluctuations in external labor market conditions has been an important theme 
in the personnel economics literature (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 
1994, Seltzer and Merrett 2000).
Sections 5 and 6 extend the model to discuss downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), the 
fact that firms often avoid nominal wage cuts— choosing to freeze wages instead— but do not avoid 
nominal wage increases (e.g., Dickens et al 2007). Section 5 extends the model by assuming that 
the worker’s fairness concerns exhibit “loss aversion” : the worker judges a transaction as especially 
unfair if, relative to the reference transaction, the worker receives a lower wage or exerts higher 
effort. Given this assumption, the worker’s effort is more responsive to wage cuts than wage 
increases. As a result, when faced with a range of shocks to its output price, the firm optimally 
freezes the wage rather than cutting it. Sections 6 adds the additional assumption that the monetary 
amounts in the worker’s reference transaction are nominal quantities, rather than real quantities. 
Besides providing a formal model of DNWR, the analysis makes a variety of novel predictions 
regarding how wage and effort respond to shocks to the firm’s output price and how these effects 
vary depending on whether the economic environment is characterized by generally increasing, 
decreasing, or stable prices.
Section 7 addresses the eff ciency of the equilibrium transaction. There are several possible 
generalizations of Pareto eff ciency that can be applied, depending on whether eff ciency is judged
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in terms of the purely self-regarding component of the worker’s payoff or in terms of the utility 
function that represents the worker’s behavior, which includes fair-mindedness and possibly also loss 
aversion. Which notion is normatively appropriate depends on what the worker’s “true” preferences 
are, by which I mean what the worker would choose with accurate beliefs and after deliberation. 
If the worker is fair-minded but not loss averse, then it does not matter which efficiency criterion 
is used because the equilibrium transaction is efficient according to both notions. However, if the 
worker is both fair-minded and loss averse, then the equilibrium may not be efficient in terms of 
utility and generally is not efficient in terms of the purely self-regarding component of preferences.
Section 8 mentions other contexts outside the labor market for which the fairness model devel­
oped in this paper may yield useful insights. The focus of the section, however, is on directions 
in which the model might be extended to be more realistic. Two directions merit discussion here 
(rather than in Section 8) because there has already been much closely related work in the behav­
ioral economics literature.
One direction is to explore alternatives to my assumption that the worker’s reference transaction 
is wholly determined by the worker’s recent personal experience. This assumption plays a key role 
in enabling the model to capture empirical regularities regarding wage changes. However, there are 
also other plausible reference transactions that may matter in some settings. As in other contexts 
of reference-dependent preferences, the reference point is likely to be at least partly influenced by 
expectations (Koszegi and Rabin 2006); see Esteves-Sorenson, Macera, and Broce (2014) and Eliaz 
and Spiegler (2014) for models of fairness with an expectation-based reference point. Moreover, 
in labor market contexts, much work has emphasized workers judging fairness by comparing their 
own wage and effort with that of other workers. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that such social 
comparisons may explain jealousy between workers, wage compression within firms, wage secrecy 
norms, and the negative correlation between occupational skill and unemployment. While the most 
direct tests from laboratory experiments find little evidence that workers’ behavior is sensitive to 
how much other workers are paid (Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans 2007, Charness and Kuhn 
2007), field evidence indicates that such social comparisons influence job satisfaction and may affect 
turnover (Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez 2012). Finally, if firms have some ability to shape their 
workers’ reference transactions, then they would have an incentive to do so.
The second direction is to incorporate important aspects of fairness preferences that are omitted 
from the model, such as reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993) or social-image or self-image concerns (e.g., 
Andreoni and Bernheim 2009).
The most closely related paper is Benjamin (2014), a companion paper that studies the same
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basic setup with a more general class of preferences. The present paper focuses on drawing out 
implications of workers’ fairness concerns for empirical labor market regularities. To that end, here
1 formally incorporate the reference transaction into the model, which is important for studying the 
implications of fairness concerns in a two-period model, and I incorporate loss aversion, which is 
important for studying wage rigidity. Benjamin (2014) and the present paper jointly supplant my 
earlier working paper, Benjamin (2005). Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) provide an overview of 
how workers’ fairness concerns relate to empirical evidence from labor markets and provide intuition 
very much in line with the formal model I develop here. Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) develop a formal 
model that addresses some of the same empirical evidence. Their approach is complementary with 
the present paper’s since they embed the firm-worker relationship into a matching model of labor 
market equilibrium but model the worker’s fairness concerns in a more reduced-form way.
2 Model Setup
2.1 The gift-exchange game
To focus on the basic workings of the model, I begin by analyzing a single-period game. There is 
a firm and a large number N  of identical workers. The firm simultaneously chooses each worker 
i ’s salary, Wi 2 R, which I refer to as the “wage.” (In principle, the firm could make the wage 
contingent on other variables, but as I explain at the beginning of Section 3 below, the firm will 
not be able to do better than an uncontingent wage.) Then each worker simultaneously chooses his 
level of effort, ei 2 R. I assume that effort is observable but not verifiable.
Before the game begins, the firm could choose not to hire a given worker, or the worker could 
choose not to work. In that case, the firm gets zero effort from that worker and pays zero wage to 
him, and the worker earns outside-option utility zero. As a tie-breaker, I assume that the firm and 
worker choose employment if indifferent with the outside option.
For simplicity, I assume that the firm’s production function is linear in effort, and effort is the 
only input. Thus, the firm’s tota l profit is n  =  p^2]N=1 ei — ^2]N=1 Wi. I refer to the exogenous 
parameter p as the price of the firm’s output, but it can also represent the productivity of the firm 
or workers. The firm’s total profit is verifiable, but since no individual worker’s effort is verifiable, 
the firm’s profit from  w orker i, Vi (wi, ef, p) =  pei — Wi, is not verifiable.
Each worker i ’s m aterial payoff is Ui (wi, ei) =  Wi — c (ei), where c (ei) is the worker’s cost-of- 
effort function satisfying c (0) =  0, c' >  0, c" >  0, c' (0) <  1, and lime i ! 1  c' (ei) =  1. Note that 
since the material payoff function is quasi-linear in the wage, the cost of effort and the material
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payoff are denominated in monetary units.
The firm’s objective is to maximize profit. In contrast, a worker’s material payoff represents the 
purely self-regarding component of his outcome from the transaction but not necessarily the utility 
function that his behavior maximizes. A worker’s utility when employed, denoted , may depend 
on both his material payoff u  and the firm’s profit from interacting with him Ki ; the worker’s utility 
function is discussed below.
Everything is common knowledge.1 The equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilib­
rium.
Since workers are identical and their bilateral interactions with the firm are independent, the 
equilibrium for each bilateral interaction will be identical. Therefore hereafter, I refer to Ki as
simply “profit,” and I drop the i subscripts from all variables to reduce notational clutter. I call
the outcome of the game, (w, e), a transaction .
The efficient level o f  effort, denoted eeff (p), is defined by p =  C (eeff). In Section 7, I discuss 
efficiency in greater detail; here I merely remark that eeff (p) is the effort that maximizes the
“material gains from trade” from the transaction, defined as the sum of the firm’s profit k  (w, e; p)
and the worker’s material payoff u (w, e). Since the wage is merely a transfer between the firm and 
the worker, the material gains from trade does not depend on it. I denote the material gains from 
trade at the efficient effort eeff (p) by M(p) =  k  (w, eeff (p) ; p) +  u (w, eeff (p)) =  peeff(p) — c(eeff(p)). 
In the analysis below, I assume that p >  1 so that both eeff (p) and M (p) are positive.
2.2 The reference transaction and concern for fairness
Several models of fairness concerns have been proposed— such as those by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
and Charness and Rabin (2002)— to describe how people trade off their own material payoff against 
others’ material payoffs. However, these models cannot be used naively as the specification for the 
worker’s utility because they are tailored to behavior in laboratory settings. In particular, the 
models specify utility over the domain of the experimental participants’ monetary gains or losses 
from the experiment. To apply these models to study a labor market interaction, two generalizations 
are needed.
First, in order to capture the players’ overall gains or losses from the labor market transaction,
1If the firm were uncertain about whether the worker has fairness concerns or is purely self-regarding, then the 
equilibrium wage would be lower. Intuitively, by offering a lower wage, the firm can get some of the benefit if the 
worker turns out to be fair-minded while insuring against losing too much if the worker turns out to be purely 
self-regarding. Since the wage would be lower, the equilibrium effort exerted by a fair-minded worker would not be 
efficient (as in Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) analysis of the gift-exchange game). The normative conclusions in Section 
7 would have to be modified, but the comparative statics in Sections 3-6 would have the same signs.
7
the utility function must take into account not only money but also effort. Therefore, in the 
formulation that follows, the worker’s utility will depend on the firm’s profit (from interacting with 
that worker) and the worker’s material payoff, which are functions of both monetary payment and 
effort. This formulation specializes to the existing models in a laboratory environment, in which 
effort e is a number chosen by an experimental participant (instead of being real effort) and the 
payoffs k and u are monetary amounts paid to the participants.
Second, the utility function must take into account that fairness is judged relative to a “reference 
transaction.” This phenomenon is clearly illustrated in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s (1986) 
evidence. Their data indicate that survey respondents consider transactions that adhere to recently 
experienced terms of exchange to be fair, even though the transactions do not equalize the agents’ 
gains. For example, they find that people consider it unfair for a landlord to raise rents on existing 
tenants, yet fair to charge a new tenant a higher price when the old tenant leaves. Most relevantly 
to the current setting, when the market wage falls, respondents consider it unfair for a firm to 
reduce a current worker’s wage to the going wage but fair to hire a new worker at that rate. Based 
on evidence from these and other scenarios, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler proposed that an 
individual perceives a transaction as unfair if it deviates from the “reference transaction,” which 
they describe as recent past experience, aspirations, or the going market terms of employment. The 
laboratory-based models can be viewed as a special case in which the reference transaction is that 
all participants in the experiment have zero earnings.
I formalize the reference transaction , (wo,eo;po), as a particular transaction (wage and 
effort) occurring at a particular value of the output price. I refer to the payoff a player would 
get from the reference transaction as the player’s reference payoff: the firm’s reference profit is 
Ko =  k (wo, eo; po), and the worker’s reference material payoff is uo =  u (wo, eo).
The perceived fairness of a transaction depends on how players’ payoffs, relative to their ref­
erence payoffs, compare to each other. To capture this idea, I define the firm ’s surplus from 
transaction (w, e) occurring at price p as u (w, e; p) =  k (w, e; p) — Ko and the w orker’s surplus as 
u (w,e) =  u (w, e) — uo. (For the functions u and u and some others below, I suppress dependence 
on the reference transaction for notational compactness.) The fairness function f  (u, u) describes 
the worker’s judgment about the fairness of his own transaction with the firm and is discussed 
further below.
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The worker’s utility function is
U =
UE =  au +  (1 — a )f (u, u) if the worker is employed 
0 if the worker is not employed
(1)
The worker’s utility when employed is the weighted sum of a self-interested component and a 
fairness component, where 0 <  a <  1 is a preference parameter describing how much the worker 
cares about himself relative to fairness. The classical model of pure self-interest is the case a = 1 .
2.3 The fairness function
I assume that the fairness function is piecewise linear:
f  (u, e)
PA_u +  (1 — Pa ) u if u >  u 
pD u +  (1 — Pd ) u if u <  u
(2)
where 1 > Pa  > 0 is the relative weight on the worker’s surplus in the case of advantageous 
unfairness, which is when the worker’s surplus exceeds the firm’s, and Pd >  Pa is the relative 
weight on the worker’s surplus in the case of disadvantageous unfairness, when the firm’s surplus 
exceeds the worker’s.2
Given fairness function (2), the worker’s utility when employed can be re-parameterized and 
written as:
UE = (3)
Pa U +  (1 — P a )'~ +  auo if u >  u
,
P d u  +  (1 — P d ) '~ +  auo if u  <  u
where Pa =  a +  Pa (1 — a) and Pd =  a  +  Pd (1 — a )  >  P a  are composite parameters describing the 
overall weight on the worker’s surplus. The utility function (3) generalizes common specifications in 
the literature. When the surpluses are incremental monetary payoffs from an experiment (in which 
case uo =  ^o =  0), parameter values satisfying Pd >  1 >  Pa >  0 corresponds to Fehr and Schmidt’s 
(1999) inequity-aversion model, while Charness and Rabin (2002) argue that 1 >  Pd >  Pa >  0.
3 The Single-Period Game
In this section, I analyze the model laid out in the previous section. First note that the setup of
the game rules out motivating the worker with a contract. Because effort is unverifiable, the firm
2The linearity of the two parts of the function is a simplifying assumption. However, the assumptions that the 
fairness function is kinked and that the kinks occur at equal surpluses are substantive. The utility function UE 
resulting from this fairness function are an example of “fairness-kinked preferences," discussed in greater generality 
in Benjamin (2014).
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cannot make the wage contingent on effort. Since total profit n  is verifiable, the firm could make 
each worker’s wage an increasing function of n . But as is well known in such settings (Prendergast 
1999, pp. 41-42), as long as the number of workers employed by the firm is large, the incentive 
effects would be negligible. For example, if the firm set each worker’s wage equal to —, then the 
worker’s gain from increasing profit by $1 would be only $—. Also note that because the worker’s 
cost-of-effort function is convex, it is strictly better for the firm to pay a certain wage than a wage 
that is contingent on a random variable. Thus, without loss of generality, we can consider the firm’s 
strategy to be the choice of an uncontingent wage level.
If the worker were purely self-interested, then the players would not transact. To discuss this 
case, suppose that w* and e* are bounded below by finite values w <  0 and e <  0, respectively. 
Regardless of the wage, the worker would choose the lowest possible effort e because doing so 
maximizes his material payoff. Knowing this, the firm would offer the lowest possible wage w. 
Thus, at least one of the players would prefer his outside option. In contrast, as is well known, if 
the worker has fairness concerns, then it may be possible to realize gains from trade (e.g., Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999).
3.1 The worker’s effort choice
The reason trade can occur is that the worker’s fairness concerns make his effort choice an increasing 
function of the wage, as long as the worker’s fairness concerns are strong enough. The following 
assumption provides sufficient conditions on the parameter values:
A ssu m ption  A . (i) >  1, and (ii) — 2.
In words, A(i) states that when the transaction is advantageously unfair, the worker puts negative 
weight on the firm’s payoff and positive weight on his own. As noted above, such “behindness 
aversion” is one of the assumptions underlying Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequity-aversion model. 
There is debate over whether behindness aversion is a reasonable assumption, and most evidence 
from dictator-game experiments is inconsistent with it (for discussion, see Benjamin’s (2014) foot­
note 6 and accompanying text). A(ii) states that the worker puts greater weight on the firm’s 
payoff than on his own when the transaction is advantageously unfair. The estimates from Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) are both consistent with a sizeable minority 
of experimental participants having — 2. The role of each part of Assumption A and the scope 
for relaxing each part are discussed below after Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.
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Let the worker’s utility-maximizing effort when employed be denoted e (w ,p ). Let e(w,p), 
defined by u (w, e; p) =  u (w, e), denote the level of effort that equates the players’ surpluses.
Lem m a 1. Under Assumption A, for any p >  1, there exists w(p) such that:
1. If w <  w(p), then e(w,p) =  e(w,p). Moreover, e(w,p) is increasing in w and decreasing in
p.
2. If w >  w(p), then e(w,p) 2 [eeg (p), e(w,p)), and e(w,p) is constant in w and increasing in
p.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 states that as long as the wage is below some threshold w, the worker 
chooses effort so as to equate the players’ surpluses from the transaction. To understand why, note 
that whenever e <  eeff, a marginal increase in effort increases the firm’s profit more than it reduces 
the worker’s material payoff. Due to Assumption A(ii) (p^. < 2), the worker when getting the 
majority of the surplus puts at least as much weight on the firm as himself. Due to Assumption 
A(i) (pd  ^  1), the worker when earning less than half the surplus puts non-positive weight on the 
firm. Consequently, for any wage at which the worker ends up exerting less than the efficient level 
of effort, the worker would increase his effort exactly up to (and not beyond) the level that equates 
the surpluses.
Part 2 of the lemma states that there is a maximum level of effort that the worker is willing 
to exert, and this maximum level of effort is above the efficient level. At wages higher than the 
threshold w, the worker’s effort (equal to the maximum) would be lower than the equal-surplus 
level. However, Part 2 of the lemma will not be relevant for the equilibrium (discussed below) 
because the firm will never want to offer a wage higher than necessary for inducing the eff cient 
level of effort.
If Assumption A(ii) were violated, then the threshold w would be low enough that the maximum 
level of effort that the worker is willing to exert would be below the efficient level. If Assumption 
A(i) were violated, then there would also be a minimum level of effort that the worker is willing 
to exert, and at wages below some threshold, the worker’s effort (equal to the minimum) would be 
higher than the equal-surplus level. We discuss these assumptions further below in the context of 
the equilibrium.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 (the relevant part for the equilibrium) also states that effort is increasing 
in the wage, holding price constant. That is because a higher wage transfers surplus from the firm
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to the worker, so equating the surpluses requires higher effort. There is evidence from police (Mas 
2006) and airline pilots (Lee and Rupp 2007) that plausibly exogenous changes in the wage cause 
corresponding changes in performance. In laboratory labor markets with one-shot, anonymous 
interactions, experimental economists have consistently found that higher wage offers induce greater 
effort (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1998, Fehr and Falk 
1999). There is an increasing number of experiments that study the effect of wage increases when 
subjects have been hired into a realistic job setting (for an early study along these lines, see 
Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson 1972). One study finds that effort increases when the wage 
increases (Cohn, Fehr, and Goette 2014), while several others find no effect (Hennig-Schmidt, 
Rockenbach, and Sadrieh 2010, Kube, Marechal, and Puppe 2013, Esteves-Sorenson and Macera 
2013). Gneezy and List (2006) find a positive effect that fades over the course of a few hours.
The final statement in Part 1 of Lemma 1 is that effort is decreasing in the price, holding the 
wage constant. That is because, all else equal, an increase in price increases the firm’s surplus, 
so equating the surpluses requires decreasing effort. I am not aware of evidence regarding this 
prediction.
3.2 The equilibrium
Given the worker’s effort function, the firm’s choice of wage pins down the equilibrium transaction. 
The following assumption provides sufficient conditions on the reference payoffs uo and Ko for the 
worker to be employed in equilibrium:
A ssu m ption  B . (i) 0 <  uo, Ko <  M (p), and (ii) (1 — 2a) uo +  Ko <  M(p).
B(i) requires that neither player’s reference payoff is too low or too high, and B(ii) requires that 
their weighted sum is not too high. Note that if the worker puts more weight on his material payoff 
than on fairness (a >  ^), then B(ii) is redundant with B(i). I return to Assumption B and discuss 
it in more detail below.
Proposition 1 states that at the equilibrium transaction, the surpluses are equal and effort is 
efficient.
P rop os ition  1. Under Assumptions A and B, for any p >  1, there is a unique equilibrium in 
which the firm hires the worker, and the equilibrium transaction (w*, e*) satisfies k (w*, e*; p )— Ko =  
u (w*, e*) — uo and e* =  eeg (p).
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Benjamin’s (2014) Proposition 2 is a closely related result (slightly less general in assuming Ko =  
uo =  0 but slightly more general in allowing some values of pD less than 1). The logic of the 
equilibrium is straightforward. Lemma 1 showed that, faced with a given wage below the threshold 
w, the worker chooses effort so as to equate the players’ surpluses. Knowing this, the firm maximizes 
profit by offering the wage level that induces the worker to choose the efficient level of effort. Lemma 
1 implies that the required wage for efficient effort is in fact below w.
The role of Assumption B is to ensure that both the worker and the firm prefer the equilibrium 
to their outside options. For example, if the worker cares at least as much about himself as about 
fairness (a >  2), then even if uo =  M  and Ko =  M — so that the worker will judge any transaction 
as unfair to at least one of the players— both players will still choose to transact at a wage that 
gives all the gains to trade to the worker: the firm earns zero profit, and UE >  0 because the 
worker’s gain in material payoff outweighs the disutility from unfairness. If the worker cares mostly 
about fairness (a <  2), Assumption B imposes an additional restriction on the reference payoffs 
because the scope for unfairness to be offset by a gain in the worker’s material payoff is more 
limited. For example, in the extreme case in which the worker cares exclusively about fairness 
(a =  0), Assumption B imposes the additional restriction that uo +  Ko — M ; if this restriction is 
violated, then any transaction will be unfair to at least one of the players, and thus the worker will 
prefer his outside option.
The result that the worker’s fairness concerns enable fully efficient exchange is perhaps surpris­
ing. In a more general model, Benjamin’s (2014) Theorems 2 and 4 provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions, respectively, for this to occur. In the present context, Assumption A(ii) (pa — 2) plays 
a key role in enabling the equilibrium to be efficient. As noted after Lemma 1, if Assumption A(ii) 
were violated, then there would be a maximum level of effort that the worker were willing to exert 
that would be lower than the efficient level. However, as long as p^ were not too much smaller 
than 2, the equilibrium for this set of parameter values would— aside from not being efficient— 
nonetheless be qualitatively similar to the equilibrium in Proposition 1: for wages below the lowest 
level w that induces maximal effort, the worker would exert effort that ensures equal surpluses, 
and the firm would therefore maximize profit by offering wage w. The comparative statics at 
this ineff cient equilibrium would be the same as those described below in Proposition 2 and later 
throughout the paper. In contrast, if p^ were too small, then the worker would be almost wholly 
self-interested, and the equilibrium outcome would be no trade.
Assumption A(i) (pD >  1) could be relaxed somewhat without affecting the equilibrium. As 
noted after Lemma 1, if pD <  1, the worker would be willing to exert effort higher than the equal-
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surplus level at low enough wages. However, as long as pD were close enough to 1, the firm would 
still maximize profit by offering the higher wage w*. In contrast, if pD were too small, then the 
worker would exert relatively high effort at a relatively low wage, and the firm could earn higher 
profit by exploiting the worker’s generosity with a low wage.
At the equilibrium from Proposition 1, Proposition 2 outlines the comparative statics.
P rop os ition  2. At the equilibrium described in Proposition 1:
1. w* and e* are both increasing in p.
2. e* does not depend on uq nor kq.
3. w* is increasing in uq and decreasing in kq.
Part 1 states that the equilibrium wage and effort are increasing in the firm’s output price p. When 
the price goes up, equilibrium effort is higher because the efficient level of effort is now higher. 
Lemma 1 states that effort would be reduced if the price increased with the wage held constant, 
but since the firm wants the worker to exert more effort, the firm must offer a higher wage in 
equilibrium.
Part 1 implies that the firm and worker share the rents when the firm becomes more profitable 
or productive. Such rent sharing is consistent with much evidence that more profitable firms pay 
higher wages to apparently identical workers (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999) and more 
profitable industries pay higher wages to all occupations (e.g., Dickens and Katz 1987). Relatedly, 
many firms institutionalize the positive relationship between profit and wages by paying workers 
through profit-sharing plans, gain-sharing plans, or stock options (Kruse et al 2003). Seventy per­
cent of firms with profit-sharing plans believe they improve productivity (Ehrenberg and Milkovich 
1987), and there is evidence that this is true (Weitzman and Kruse 1990, Kruse 1993). The pos­
itive effect of profit-sharing on worker performance is a puzzle for standard incentive theory with 
self-interested workers because, as noted at the beginning of this section, free riding by workers 
makes the potential positive incentive effects negligible (Prendergast 1999).3
While more profitable firms may pay higher wages for a number of reasons— for example, to 
attract higher-ability workers— several sources of evidence indicate that rent sharing may be at 
least partly due to workers’ fairness concerns. For one thing, managers themselves say that fairness
3 Even if workers can monitor each other and punish poor performance, workers would be expected to free ride on 
monitoring in companies with many workers.
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perceptions play a primary motivational role in real-world wage policies (e.g., Blinder and Choi 1990, 
Levine 1993, Agell and Lundborg 1995, Campbell and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999). In addition, 
rent sharing arises in anonymous, one-shot laboratory labor markets that rule out alternative 
mechanisms (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 1993, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 1998, Falk and Fehr 
1999, Brown, Falk, and Fehr 2004).
In labor economics, rent sharing is often modeled as the outcome of Nash bargaining between 
a firm and a worker. While Nash bargaining also leads to the worker exerting efficient effort and 
the two players splitting the surplus, there is an important difference. In a bargaining model, the 
surpluses are calculated relative to the firm’s and worker’s outside options, whereas in the fairness 
model, the surpluses are calculated relative to the worker’s reference transaction. Thus, the fairness 
model predicts that a worker with a more favorable reference transaction (say, due to having had 
a better deal in his last job) should be paid more than a worker with an identical outside option 
but who has a less favorable reference transaction.
Returning to Proposition 2, Parts 2 and 3 provide comparative statics with respect to changes in 
the reference transaction. The eff cient level of effort does not depend on the reference transaction, 
and hence the equilibrium effort is independent of uo and ^o. However, at the efficient level of effort, 
when the reference transaction is more favorable to the worker (uo is greater) or less favorable to 
the firm (^o is smaller), equating the surpluses requires giving the worker a higher material payoff 
and the firm a lower profit. Therefore the equilibrium wage is higher.
4 The Two-Period Game
In the previous section, the reference transaction was treated as an exogenous constant. The key 
difference in the dynamic version of the model in this section is that the reference transaction 
evolves over time. I show that if the reference transaction is shaped by the worker’s recent personal 
experience, then the model can explain two important empirical regularities about wage dynamics:
(1) workers paid more at time of hire earn higher wages subsequently, and (2) the wage of a worker 
who remains at a firm is largely unaffected by variation in external labor market conditions.
To address these stylized facts in as simple a model as possible, I study a two-period setting. 
In period t =  1, the worker is “new” at the firm. The firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer 
w\ to the worker. If the worker refuses, the game ends, and the players get their outside-option 
profit/utility of 0 in both periods. If the worker accepts, then the worker chooses effort ei, and the 
game continues into period 2. The firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer W2 to the “incumbent”
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worker. The worker can refuse, in which case both players get their outside-option profit/utility of 
0 for that period, or accept and choose effort e2. Profit and the worker’s material payoff in each 
period are the same as in the single-period game from the previous section. In period 1, the firm 
maximizes the expected sum of its profit in each period, k1 +  E1K2, and the worker maximizes 
U\ +  E 1 U2 . The expectation appears because pt is a random variable, which I assume is drawn i.i.d. 
from an atomless distribution that has full support on (1 ,1). In both periods, as a tie-breaker, I 
assume that the players choose to transact if indifferent. In the pre-game “period 0,” the worker 
was employed in the external labor market, not at the firm.
To complete the model, I assume that the reference transaction is the worker’s recent personal 
experience: the period-1 reference transaction reflects the worker’s experience prior to employment 
with the firm (in “period 0” ) and is taken as exogenous, and the period-2 reference transaction 
equals the transaction that occurred in period 1. The reference transaction thus links the two 
periods. The “recent-experience assumption” is consistent with some experimental evidence (Herz 
and Taubinsky 2013) as well as much survey evidence such as Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s 
(1986) mentioned in Section 2.2 (see also Thaler 1985 and Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003).
For the two-period game, Assumptions A and B need to be modified as follows:
A ssu m ption  A 0. (i) pD >  1 and (ii) •
A ssu m ption  B 0. (i) 0 — uo,Ko — M(pi1+e m (p2), and (ii) uo +  Ko — fM(pif + f M .
A0(i) is identical to A(i), but A0(ii) imposes a tighter bound than A(ii). I discuss the role of 
A0( ii) after presenting the proposition below. Assumption B0 is analogous to Assumption B but 
differs because when deciding whether or not to transact in period 1, the players take into account 
the anticipated period-2 equilibrium payoffs. Relative to B0(i), B0(ii) imposes a non-redundant 
restriction whenever a <  1.
The game is straightforward to solve using backward induction. Since period 2 is the single­
period game, period-2 behavior is as described in the previous section. The period-1 transaction 
affects period 2 by becoming the worker’s reference transaction. If the worker were purely self­
interested, then the players would not transact in either period.
Proposition 3 characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-period game.
P rop os ition  3. Under Assumptions A1 and B 0, with positive probability there is a unique equilib­
rium in which the firm hires the worker in both periods• The equilibrium transactions, (w%, e£) for 
t = 1 ,  2, satisfy k (w£, e£; pt) -  K t-1 =  u(w£, e£) -  u t-1 and et =  eeff(pt).
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As in Proposition 1, Assumption B0— that uo and Ko are neither too low nor too high— helps ensure 
that the firm hires the worker in period 1. If the period-2 price realization is much lower than the 
period-1 price realization, however, then Ki and ui may be so high that the worker prefers his 
outside option in period 2.
Assuming the price realizations make it profit-maximizing for the firm to hire the worker in 
both periods, Assumption A(ii) (pa  — 2 ) is sufficient to imply that the worker chooses effort so as 
to equate the surpluses in period 2. In period 1, however, the worker anticipates that higher effort 
will lead to a less favorable reference transaction for period 2 and therefore a lower equilibrium 
period-2 material payoff. Since higher effort in period 1 reduces not only the worker’s period-1 
material payoff but also his period-2 material payoff, the maximum level of effort the worker is 
willing to exert is lower in period 1 than in period 2. The role of A0 (ii) (p a  — ) is to ensure that
the period-1 maximum effort is nonetheless higher than the eff cient level, and thus the equilibrium 
effort in period 1 is also efficient.4
Proposition 4 outlines the comparative statics.
P rop os ition  4. At the equilibrium described in Proposition 3: for t =  1, 2,
1. wl and el are both increasing in pt.
2. el does not depend on uo nor ko.
3. wl is increasing in uo and decreasing in ko.
Part 1 says that each period’s wage and effort is higher if the firm’s output price in that period 
is higher. This is the same rent sharing as in Proposition 2. Just as in the single-period model, in 
each period the firm maximizes profit by inducing the efficient level of effort. Because the worker 
chooses effort to equate the surpluses, inducing higher effort when the output price is higher requires 
paying a higher wage. This result for the two-period model predicts that rent sharing should be 
observed not only in the cross section across firms but also in the time series within a firm.
4An alternative version of the proposition (with a suitably modified Assumption B 0) could allow for the parameter 
values Tp- <  <  2. In that case, the worker’s period-1 maximum effort would be below the efficient level. In
the period-1 equilibrium, the firm would offer the lowest wage that elicits that maximal level of effort, and in the 
period-2 equilibrium, the worker would exert eff cient effort and the firm would offer the higher wage that induces 
it. Therefore, for parameter values in this range, the model predicts that wage and effort will rise over the course of 
employment. I do not emphasize this prediction because it relies on the worker correctly anticipating the effect of 
current effort on future fairness judgments, which I believe is much less psychologically plausible than other features 
of the model.
17
Part 2 states that the worker’s effort does not depend on his period-0 transaction. As in the 
single-period model, this result follows directly from the worker choosing the efficient level of effort 
in both periods.
Part 3 of the proposition states that the worker’s wage in both periods is increasing in the 
period-0 material payoff and decreasing in the period-0 profit. The logic hinges on the reference 
transaction being determined by the previous period’s transaction. When the worker’s reference 
payoff is higher and the firm’s reference payoff is lower going in to period 1, the firm must pay a 
higher wage in period 1 to induce the efficient level of effort. Consequently, the worker’s period-1 
material payoff is higher, and the firm’s period-1 profit is lower. Since this means that the worker’s 
reference payoff is higher and the firm’s reference payoff is lower going in to period 2, the firm must 
also pay a higher wage in period 2.5
Part 3 of the proposition implies the first motivating fact for this section: workers paid more in 
period 1 will also tend to be paid more in period 2. Evidence from administrative records indicates 
that, indeed, cohorts of workers who experience high entry wages continue to earn relatively high 
wages throughout their tenure at the firm (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994). Beaudry and 
DiNardo (1991) similarly find that market conditions at the time a worker begins working for a 
firm has a persistent effect on subsequent earnings (see also Grant 2003, Kahn 2010, and Devereux 
2002).
The second motivating fact is that labor market conditions external to the firm do not affect 
the worker’s wage. This is indeed true in the model: the worker’s wage path would be unaffected 
by small variations in the worker’s outside-option payoff because as long as the worker is employed, 
the wage is fully determined by the current output price and the previous period’s transaction. The 
empirical observation that incumbent workers’ wages are largely shielded by fluctuations in labor- 
market supply and demand conditions has been an important theme in the personnel economics 
literature (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994, Seltzer and Merrett 
2000).6
5In fact, the model implies that a 1-unit increase in u0 (or a 1-unit decrease in ^0) has exactly the same effect on 
as it has on w j. I do not emphasize this stronger result because it is sensitive to the simplifying assumption that 
for a fixed level of total surplus, the fairness function is maximized by equating the surpluses. In the more general case 
of “fairness-kinked preferences" (analyzed in Benjamin 2014), the fairness component of preferences is maximized by 
making the worker’s material payoff an increasing function of profit, but not necessarily the identity function.
6 Another potential prediction of the model is that salaries of new workers vary with labor market conditions at 
time of hire. This is implied by the model if it is assumed that the period-0 transaction reflects conditions in the 
labor market in period 0. Such an assumption is consistent with the evidence presented by Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1986). Consistent with the prediction, empirical work generally finds that wages of new workers are much 
more sensitive to labor market conditions than wages o f incumbent workers (e.g., Bils 1985, Abowd and Card 1987, 
Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994). However, I do not emphasize this prediction 
because the connection is loose between the assumption that the reference transaction is determined by recent
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In labor economics, the two empirical regularities highlighted in this section are often attributed 
to long-term implicit contracts (e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). According to the implicit con­
tract interpretation, there is a mutual understanding between the worker and the firm at time of 
hire about the state-contingent wage path. Labor market conditions at time of hire determine the 
level of the worker’s initial wage, and subsequent labor market conditions are irrelevant because the 
wage evolves according to the tacitly agreed contract. The implicit contract is often modeled as a 
reputational equilibrium of a repeated game (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson 1989). A potentially 
unsatisfactory aspect of this approach is that such games generally have many equilibria and can 
flexibly fit a wide variety of possible compensation patterns.
The analysis in this section has shown that worker’s fairness concerns can provide an alternative 
microfoundation for implicit contracts. The empirical regularities arise as the unique equilibrium 
of the dynamic version of the fairness model. The fairness theory also makes the testable prediction 
that entry wage persistence and shielding of wages from external labor markets should be observed 
even in settings where repetition and reputation forces are weak.
5 Loss Aversion and Downward Real Wage Rigidity
While in many countries including the U.S., the predominant pattern of wage stickiness is down­
ward nominal wage rigidity, there is also strong evidence for downward real wage rigidity, especially 
in countries with greater union density (Dickens et al 2007). This section explores how workers’ 
concern for fairness— when combined with loss aversion— could provide a plausible account of down­
ward wage rigidity and what additional predictions emerge from such an explanation. Since I defer 
explicitly modeling the distinction between real and nominal quantities until Section 6, the analysis 
in this section is best interpreted as relating to downward real wage rigidity.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, I return to the single-period framework from Section 
3, except that (like in Section 4) I assume that p is a random variable drawn from an atomless 
distribution that has full support on (1 ,1). Moreover, I interpret “period 0” as a time in which 
the worker was employed at the same firm.
I add to the model “loss aversion,” the assumption that losses are weighted more heavily than 
equivalently-sized gains. Loss aversion is an important feature of preferences in individual decision­
making, in both riskless and risky choices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Koszegi and Rabin 2006).
personal experience (maintained in the rest of the paper) and the assumption that, when the worker is unemployed, 
it is determined by conditions in the labor market (needed for the result discussed in this footnote).
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While loss aversion has been formalized primarily in models of individual decision-making, available 
evidence suggests that it also matters for fairness judgments. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986) find that only 20% of respondents consider it unfair for a company to eliminate a 
ten-percent annual bonus, whereas 61% consider it unfair to reduce wages by ten percent (holding 
constant total compensation across the two scenarios).7
To capture such loss aversion, I assume that the worker weights losses more heavily than gains 
when calculating his own surplus from the transaction. The evidence for loss aversion in individual 
decision-making implies that it would also enter into the worker’s non-fairness-related utility, but 
to conserve notation, I incorporate loss aversion only into fairness judgments; in the gift-exchange 
game I study here, loss aversion in the selfish component of the worker’s preferences would affect 
his willingness to accept employment, but it would not affect his effort choice conditional on em­
ployment (and thus would not generate downward wage rigidity) since the worker’s effort choice is 
entirely driven by his fairness concerns.8
Formally, I generalize the specification of the worker’s surplus payoff as follows: given reference- 
transaction wage wq and effort eo,
u (w , e) =  A (w — wo) +  A (—c (e) +  c (e o )),
where
A (x)
x x >  0 
Ax x <  0
and A >  1 is a parameter capturing the degree of loss aversion. The model specializes to the case 
considered in Section 3 if A = 1 ,  but if A >  1, the worker weights losses relative to the reference 
transaction more heavily than gains. I follow Koszegi and Rabin (2006) in assuming that loss 
aversion matters separately for the two dimensions that affect the worker’s material payoff, in this 
context wage and effort. Thus, the specification implies that a worker dislikes a wage cut more
7Given this evidence that reducing a bonus is not perceived as negatively as cutting base pay, it may be puzzling 
that firms do not pay workers much of their compensation through bonuses. One possible explanation is that bonuses 
may be (correctly) perceived by workers as less permanent, and thus holding total compensation constant, workers 
prefer to take a job that offers higher base pay.
8In a setting with contractible effort, loss aversion in the selfish component of the worker’s preferences could 
dampen wage adjustments but would still not cause the distribution of wage changes to have a pile-up at zero. At 
an optimal contract, the firm would set the wage such that, given the firm’s preferred level of effort, the worker’s 
participation constraint binds, UE =  0. A change in the output price would cause the firm’s preferred level o f effort 
to change, which would require a change in the wage. Even without fairness concerns, if the worker were loss averse 
over wages, then to keep the worker on the UE =  0 indifference curve, the wage would have to be cut by less when 
effort falls than it would have to rise when effort increases. In a multi-period model, anticipating the costliness of 
wage variability over time, the firm would dampen its wage adjustments in response to changes in the output price 
(as per the logic in Elsby, 2009) — but the firm would nonetheless cut wages at least somewhat in response to any 
fall in the output price.
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than he likes a same-sized raise, and the worker also dislikes increasing his effort more than he likes 
a same-sized reduction in effort.
Partly to avoid substantially complicating the model but mostly because I suspect it is approx­
imately true, I assume that the worker does not weight losses more than gains when calculating 
the firm’s surplus. That is, the firm’s surplus profit is the same as in Section 3: e  (w,e; p) =  
[pe — poeo] +  [—w +  wq].9 As in Section 3, f  (u, e ) is given by equation (2).
5 .1  T h e  w o rk e r ’ s e ffo r t  c h o ic e
As in the analysis in Section 3, given the output price p, there is a maximum level of effort that 
the worker is willing to exert. But for a wage w below the threshold that induces maximum effort, 
the worker’s optimal effort e (w,p) equates the worker’s surplus and the firm’s surplus. Thus, as 
before, effort is increasing in the wage and the output price. Due to loss aversion, however, a wage 
cut reduces the worker’s surplus more than a wage increase raises it. Consequently, effort is more 
responsive to the wage when the worker is experiencing a wage cut. Similarly, because the worker’s 
surplus is affected more strongly by an increase in effort than by a decrease in effort, effort is more 
responsive to the wage when the worker is reducing effort.9 10
Lem m a 2. Under Assumption A, if A >  1, then for any p >  1, there exists a w(p) such that for 
w0 <  w(p):
1. Effort responds more to wage cuts than to wage increases: —limlim
de(w,p) 
w " w °  dw
de(w,p) 
w # w 0 @w
> 1.
2. Effort is more responsive to wage changes when effort is below the reference level of effort
lim @ e(w , p )
than when effort is below it: — e Te ° ge@f„) >  1.
lime #e ° — k f f 1
If wq >  w(p), then e(w,p) is constant in w.
9 If instead I assumed that the worker’s calculation of the firm’s surplus did have loss aversion over revenue and 
over the wage payout, then these would not qualitatively affect the prediction of downward wage rigidity and would 
counteract upward effort rigidity. A fall in the output price would cause the firm to experience a loss in revenue, 
which would make effort increase by more than it would in the absence of loss aversion over revenue. But cutting 
the wage would still cause a discontinuous increase in the sensitivity of effort to the wage, making the firm reluctant 
to cut the wage. Loss aversion over the firm’s wage payout would make effort more responsive to wage increases, 
which would counteract upward effort rigidity. As far as I am aware, there is little evidence on whether people are 
loss averse over others’ surpluses when making fairness judgments involving themselves and others.
10 It would not be necessary to consider wage increases/decrease separately from effort decreases/increases if effort 
always changed in the same direction as the wage. In fact, however, Proposition 5 below will show that in this model 
with loss aversion, effort can change even when the wage does not, and effort may not change when the wage does. 
Moreover, in the absence of the assumption I make below that the reference transaction is an equilibrium, wage and 
effort could move in opposite directions.
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Part 1 of Lemma 2 shows that the model provides a microfoundation for Akerlof and Yellen’s 
(1990) “fair wage-effort hypothesis,” which postulates that effort is more sensitive to the wage 
when the wage is below a reference wage (which Akerlof and Yellen call the “fair wage” )  than when 
the wage is above it.11 Thus, the large body of evidence discussed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
is supportive of Part 1. This includes evidence from surveys that managers believe that effort 
responds more to wage cuts than to raises (e.g., Campbell and Kamlani 1997), from psychology 
experiments that effort is less responsive to wage increases than to wage decreases (e.g., Walster, 
Walster, and Berscheid 1977), and from sociological observations of work restrictions in response 
to wages perceived as too low (e.g., Mathewson 1969). More recently, in economics experiments, 
Kube, Marechal, and Puppe (2013) find no effect on effort in response to a wage increase, but they 
find a decrease in effort in response to a wage cut. I am not aware of any evidence regarding Part 
2 of Lemma 2.
5.2 The equilibrium with loss aversion
The basic logic of equilibrium is similar to that from Section 3: the worker chooses effort so as 
to equate the surpluses, and the firm chooses the wage to maximize the sum of the surpluses. 
The difference is that the worker’s surplus now incorporates loss aversion. Because the sum of 
the surpluses is maximized, the firm’s and worker’s marginal rates of substitution (MRSs) between 
effort and wage calculated from the surpluses are equal in equilibrium. The firm’s MRS is j . If 
the worker is not experiencing a loss in either wage or effort, then the worker’s MRS is , and 
thus the equilibrium effort will satisfy p =  o' (e)— the same as equating the MRSs calculated from 
profit and material payoff. If the worker is experiencing a loss in both, then the worker’s MRS as 
calculated from his surplus is AcA(e), and thus the equilibrium effort will similarly satisfy p =  o' (e). 
However, if the worker suffers a loss in effort but not wage, then the worker’s MRS is AlM  , and 
the equilibrium effort satisfies p =  Ac' (e). And if the worker suffers a loss in wage but not effort, 
then the worker’s MRS is , and the equilibrium effort satisfies p =  . Note that effort is not
efficient in the latter two cases.
In Section 3, the reference transaction was allowed to be arbitrary. In this section, however, my 
aim is to study changes in wage and effort that are due to shocks to the firm’s output price. If the 
previous period’s transaction were arbitrary, then wage or effort changes could instead be the result
11The “fair wage-effort hypothesis” does not have an analog for Part 2. Note also that the model in this paper 
differs from Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) framework by specifically identifying the reference wage with its period-0
level.
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of non-optimal choices in the previous period. For example, if the period-0 wage were extremely 
high, then the firm would cut the wage in period 1, regardless of the output price. While such 
situations may sometimes be of interest, here I impose the restriction on the period-0 transaction 
that it was an equilibrium of the same game played in period 0.
The reference transaction must therefore fall into one of the cases above: (i) po =  d (eo), (ii) 
po =  Ad (eo), or (iii) po =  c Ao). I refer to (i) as the steady-state case because in this case, if the 
output price remained constant (p =  po), then the period-0 equilibrium transaction would also be 
the period-1 equilibrium transaction. Even though the model is static, I use the language “steady 
state” because a steady-state equilibrium would be a convergence point in a repeated version of 
the model absent price changes.
I call (ii) the recent-increase case because it corresponds to a situation in which both wage 
and effort increased in the previous period. It could describe a setting in which the firm is becoming 
more productive or industry demand is increasing. It is not a “steady state” because if the output 
price remained constant (p =  po), then the period-0 equilibrium transaction (wo,eo) could not be 
the period-1 equilibrium. If the firm set the same wage w =  wo, then the worker’s optimal effort 
choice e (w,p) would equate the period-1 surpluses— but this would differ from the effort choice eo 
that equated the period-0 surpluses because the worker would not be experiencing a loss in period 
1.
Analogously, I call (iii) the recent-decrease case because it occurs when both wage and effort 
decreased in the previous period. It would be most frequent when the output price is trending 
downward (e.g., because demand is declining) or the firm is becoming less productive. Like the 
recent-increase case, it is not a “steady state.”
Proposition 5, the main result of this section, outlines the implications of the model for wage and 
effort as a function of the price realization and whether the reference transaction is in the steady- 
state, recent-increase, or recent-decrease case. To sidestep defining an analog of Assumption B 
(which would be more complex), the proposition focuses on equilibria in which the players transact. 
To facilitate stating the result, define
pw-rigid; pw-rigidy — po ' <
1
A2 ; A
(A, 1)
(1,A)
in the recent-increase case 
in the steady-state case 
in the recent-decrease case
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and
in the recent-increase case 
in the steady-state case • 
in the recent-decrease case
P rop os ition  5. Under Assumption A, if the firm hires the worker in equilibrium, then the 
equilibrium (w*,e*) is unique almost surely. Moreover:
1. If p 2  rigid, pw-rigid ), then w* =  wo, e* >  eo, and e* is strictly decreasing in p.
2. If p 2 ( p  rigid;pe-rigid ), then e* =  eo, w* >  wo, and w* is strictly increasing in p.
3. If p is outside the above ranges, then w* and e* are both strictly increasing in p.
Part 3 of the proposition implies that for a large enough positive shock, the firm increases the 
wage and the worker increases effort, and for a large enough negative shock, the firm cuts the wage 
and the worker reduces effort. The qualitatively distinctive implications of loss aversion arise for 
relatively small negative or positive shocks, as described in Parts 1 and 2 of the proposition.
Part 1 states that the wage is rigid when the price realization occurs within the interval 
(pw rigid ’ pw-rigid). Recall from Lemma 2 that effort is more responsive to the wage when w <  wo 
than when w >  wo. The value pw-rigid is the price at which the worker chooses effort eo when the 
firm sets the wage wo. For a price realization just below pw-rigid, the profit-maximizing wage is the 
corner solution wo. Intuitively, starting from the wage wo, since the price has fallen, the worker 
chooses inefficiently high effort (e (wo,p) >  eeff (p)) to keep the surpluses equal. Thus, the firm 
would like to reduce the wage slightly, but if it did so, then effort would discontinuously become 
more responsive to the wage, making the optimal wage higher. The value pw id is the price at
which the firm is just indifferent between setting the wage wo thereby inducing ineff ciently high 
effort and cutting the wage with the consequent sharp reduction in effort. (It is because of this 
indifference when p =  pw that the proposition states that the equilibrium is unique “almost 
surely. ” )
The model makes two novel predictions regarding effort in the region of wage rigidity. First, 
the level of effort will be higher than in the previous period. That is because effort is eo when the 
price realization is exactly pw-rigid, and for lower price realizations, with the wage held fixed, effort 
needs to be higher to keep the surpluses equal. Second, effort is decreasing in the output price— 
the opposite comparative static from when the price shock causes a wage adjustment— because
pe-rigid; fr ig id ) — po ' <
( i , 1)
(1,A)
(A, A2)
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the lower the price, the higher the equal-surplus effort level. In principle, both of these predictions 
could provide a way of distinguishing the fairness theory from alternative explanations of downward 
wage rigidity. In practice, however, it may be difficult to find a clean natural experiment because 
complications that are omitted from the model may have implications in the opposite direction. For 
example, in real-world settings there is typically asymmetric information, and workers might reduce 
effort if they believe management is misrepresenting the firm’s profitability. And due to negative 
reciprocity, if workers perceive management to be responsible for the problems, they may want 
to punish the firm. Indeed, in one manufacturing company that cut wages studied by Greenberg 
(1990), apologizing and informing workers that a pay cut was necessitated by financial pressures led 
to a smaller increase in employee theft. This finding may suggest that blaming the company and 
not appreciating the severity of the financial problems are forces that cause workers to withdraw 
effort.
I am aware of a bit of evidence, albeit somewhat indirect, related to the second of these pre­
dictions: managers that find it necessary to reduce wages do not seem to suffer consequences as 
drastic as predicted by other managers who describe what would happen if they cut wages (Bewley 
1999). In the equilibrium of the model, if the realized price is just low enough to make it optimal 
to cut wages, the worker’s effort is actually higher than if the realized price were the same as the 
period-0 price.
Another set of distinguishing predictions comes from Part 2 of Proposition 5, which states 
that the effort is rigid when the price realization occurs within the interval ^p  r_ d ,p e-rigid ). This 
prediction follows from the result in Lemma 2 that effort is more responsive to the wage when e <  eo 
than when e >  eo. The intuition underlying effort rigidity is similar to that for wage rigidity: for 
any price realization between p  id and pe-rigid, starting from whatever wage is needed to induce 
effort level eo, effort is inefficiently low (eo <  eeff (p)) and thus the firm would like to increase the 
wage, but then effort would become discontinuously less responsive to the wage, making the optimal 
wage lower. The profit-maximizing wage is a corner solution, the wage level that induces exactly 
eo. This wage is higher than in the previous period— even if the price shock is negative— and is 
increasing in the price. I am not aware of any evidence regarding effort rigidity.
A final set of novel predictions relates to when wage and effort rigidity are predicted to occur. 
The steady-state case is predicted to exhibit downward wage rigidity in response to a small negative 
shock and upward effort rigidity in response to a small positive shock. In contrast, in the recent- 
increase case, there are no rigidities in response to a positive shock because the worker will remain in 
the domain of a gain in wage (w >  wo) and a loss in effort (e >  eo); thus when the firm increases the
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wage, there are no discontinuous changes in the responsiveness of effort. For the price realization 
p =  po, the firm optimally sets the wage that induces effort eo, but this wage is higher than wo 
because effort is relatively unresponsive to the wage (since the worker is in the domain of a loss 
in effort). For a small negative shock, the firm reduces the wage toward wo, and the equilibrium 
occurs in the region of effort rigidity. For a somewhat larger negative shock, the equilibrium instead 
occurs in the region of wage rigidity. The recent-decrease case is analogous to the recent-increase 
case: there are no rigidities in response to a negative shock, a small positive shock generates wage 
rigidity, and a somewhat larger positive shock generates effort rigidity. While I am not aware of 
much evidence regarding this rich set of predictions, I discuss some related evidence in the next 
section.
6 Money Illusion and Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
While there is evidence for downward real wage rigidity, the evidence is more widespread for 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), which extends across union and non-union firms in 
a range of countries and inflationary environments (Dickens et al 2007). Figure 1, taken from 
Fehr and Goette (2005), shows the distribution of wage changes in Switzerland in 1994, a year in 
which inflation was 1.6%. As is typical, there are more wage increases than decreases, and there 
is a pile-up of observations at zero wage change. DNWR is a puzzle that may have important 
consequences for understanding business cycles (Elsby 2004, Collard and de la Croix 2000) and for 
optimal inflation-targeting (Tobin 1972, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 1996).
Fairness plays a prominent role in informal explanations of DNW R.12 Managers say they avoid 
wage cuts because workers would perceive them as unfair (Blinder and Choi 1990, Kaufman 1984, 
Agell and Lundborg 1995) and respond with worse performance (e.g., Bewley 1999, Campbell and 
Kamlani 1997).
To study DNWR, I make one crucial modification to the model from the previous section: I
12 A major alternative explanation is that cutting the wage will cause the workers who have the best outside 
option— the most productive workers— to quit, and it is more profitable to lay off the least productive workers. 
This explanation makes sense theoretically in environments in which workers with the same job category must be 
paid equally, which is often true in unionized firms and is sometimes imposed in non-unionized firms by the firm’s 
personnel policies; firms without the equal-pay constraint could instead adjust wages optimally for each individual 
worker according to his or her productivity. Other alternative explanations seem much less plausible. Menu costs of 
changing wages (Ball and Mankiw 1994) have difficulty explaining why so many wage changes are small, including 
wage increases. Moreover, the source of menu costs is not clear in this context. Insurance from an optimal long-term 
contract against wage reductions (Harris and Holmstrom 1982) has difficulty explaining why wages seem downward 
rigid in high-turnover jobs and why wage cuts do sometimes occur. Explicit contracts with loss averse workers 
might prohibit wage reductions (Elsby 2004), but such explicit provisions are unusual. When managers are directly 
confronted with “fairness" versus other explanations, they typically endorse fairness (e.g., Campbell and Kamlani 
1997, Blinder and Choi 1990).
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assume that the monetary amounts in the worker’s reference transaction are nominal quantities, 
rather than real quantities. This “money illusion” assumption is consistent with survey evidence on 
how people make a variety of judgments (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky 1997), including fairness 
judgments. For example, survey respondents consider it much less fair for a company to reduce 
salaries by 7% when inflation is 0% than to increase salaries by only 5% when inflation is 12%, 
even though the two are equivalent in real terms (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986).
If some workers are not subject to money illusion (perhaps because union leaders explain to 
workers that they should adjust for inflation) and some workers are, then the analysis from the 
previous section would apply to the first type of worker, and the analysis from this section would 
apply to the second type. The evidence that actual wage distributions exhibit both downward real 
wage rigidity and DNWR would be explained by the population of workers being a mixture of these 
types.
To formally model fairness concerns with money illusion, I denote the current price level by 
the exogenous constant P  >  0. The nom inal wage is Pw, and the nom inal price of the firm’s 
output is Pp. The reference transaction, (wo,eo;po,Po), now includes the period-0 price  level 
Po >  0. I interpret the worker’s material payoff as reflecting the utility he gets from consuming the 
goods he purchases (and his disutility of effort), so it continues to depend only on real quantities: 
u (w ,e) =  w — c (e). The worker’s fairness function is the same as before, but now the surpluses 
are nominal. The firm’s surplus payoff is the firm’s nominal profit relative to its period-0 nominal 
profit:
e  (w, e; p, P ) =  [Ppe -  Popoeo] +  [ -P w  +  Powo] .
The worker’s surplus payoff is
e  (w, e; P ) =  A (Pw — Po wo) +  P  A (—c (e) +  c (e o )).
The firm term means that the worker evaluates his gain or loss in the nominal wage. The second 
term has a different form than the first term because effort is not a monetary amount and is 
therefore not subject to money illusion: if e =  eo, then the second term is zero regardless of how 
the price level changes. However, the second term needs to be multiplied by the price level because 
the worker’s surplus is measured in nominal units. Because the worker’s utility when employed 
is measured in real units, its fairness component (which is now measured in nominal units) needs 
to be normalized by the price level: UE =  cu  +  (1 — c ) f  . When the price level is constant 
(P  =  Po), it cancels out of the worker’s utility function, and the model specializes to that from the 
previous section.
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As before, the worker’s optimal effort e (wP,pP) equates the worker’s surplus and the firm’s 
surplus, but now it depends on the nominal wage and output price. Therefore a nominal analog 
of Lemma 2 applies: effort is more responsive to nominal wage cuts than nominal wage increases, 
and it is more responsive to the nominal wage when effort is above its reference level than when it 
is below.
Assuming that the period-0 transaction was an equilibrium in period 0, the reference transaction 
can again be put into one of three cases: (i) the steady-state case (po =  C (eo)), (ii), the recent- 
increase case (po =  Ac0 (eo)), or (iii) the recent-decrease case (po =  c ). Now, however, “recent 
increase,” and “recent decrease” refer to what recently happened to effort and the nominal wage. 
Relatedly, the interpretation of “steady state” is different. In order for the period-1 equilibrium 
transaction (w*,e*) to equal the period-0 equilibrium transaction (wo,eo), not only the output 
price needs to remain constant (p =  po) but also the price level needs to remain constant (P  =  Po).
The model predicts DNWR because Proposition 5 carries over but with the nominal price and 
nominal wage replacing the real price and real wage everywhere in the proposition. To illustrate 
the model’s predictions about the cross section of wage changes for this case, Figure 2 shows, for 
a particular specification of the model’s parameters, simulation results for how a smooth (log­
normal) distribution of price changes translates into the distribution of wage changes.13 Panels 
A and B show cases of no loss aversion (A =  1) and loss aversion (A >  1), respectively. The 
reference transaction is in the steady-state case, and to parallel the data in Figure 1, the inflation 
rate is set to 1.6%. While the model is highly stylized, the predicted distribution of wage changes 
under loss aversion replicates two of the qualitative features of the empirical distribution shown 
in Figure 1: a spike at zero, and an apparent shift of mass away from the negative-wage-change 
part of the distribution (into the spike at zero). However, given a population of identical firms and 
workers, the model cannot explain why there are some slightly negative wage changes. As noted 
after Proposition 5, at the lowest price in the wage-rigidity range, the firm switches from wo to a 
discretely lower wage, and for lower price realizations, the equilibrium wage is even lower. Thus, 
the model generates a gap in the distribution of wage changes between zero and a slightly negative 
wage change.14 With plausible heterogeneity in firms and workers, however, the gap would occur 
in different places for different firm-worker pairs, and the data averaged over many workers would
13 The Mathematica code used to generate Figure 2 is available on the author’s website.
14In a different context (without fairness concerns)— the distribution of U.S. income tax filings— Rees-Jones (2014) 
has shown that loss aversion generates a similar “shift” and “spike” in the distribution. The underlying mechanics 
for the prediction are similar to those underlying wage rigidity, but in that context, there is no predicted gap in the 
distribution of filings.
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have no gap.
It is sometimes argued that inflation “greases the wheels” of the labor market by enabling 
downward real wage adjustments to occur when it is efficient for them to occur. In terms of the 
model, the nominal analog of Proposition 5 indeed implies that the real wage is downward flexible 
as long as the nominal wage does not need to be cut. However, the model also implies that inflation 
causes redistribution from workers to firms: because effort responds to the nominal wage, whenever 
the price level increases, the firm can induce its desired level of effort with a lower real wage.15 
However, since a fall in the real wage reduces the worker’s material payoff, this redistribution will 
ultimately be limited by the firm’s need to beat the worker’s outside option. The model similarly 
predicts that deflation causes redistribution from firms to workers because when the price level 
falls, firms need to pay a higher real wage to induce any given level of effort.
The model also has implications for how the frequency distribution of wage changes depends 
on the average rate of increase of nominal prices Pp across firms. Starting from an average rate of 
increase close to zero, a higher rate— corresponding to an economy with a higher rate of inflation 
or productivity growth, or an industry experiencing growing demand— is predicted to generate a 
lower frequency of zero wage changes. A lower fraction of firms will be in the recent-decrease case, 
and hence a greater fraction of firms need to be hit by a negative shock in order to exhibit DNWR. 
Moreover, fewer firms will be hit by negative shocks. Consequently, fewer firms will be in the 
region of wage rigidity. Consistent with this prediction, Fehr and Goette’s (2005) evidence from 
Switzerland during 1991-1997 indicates that the frequency of zero nominal wage changes was lower 
in the early period of substantially higher inflation.
If most firms are experiencing sustained declines in Pp— as would occur in an economic envi­
ronment of deflation or productivity decline, or an industry with contracting demand— then there 
will be very few zero wage changes because most firms will be in the recent-decrease case and thus 
wages will not be rigid when Pp falls. Consistent with this prediction, Kuroda and Yamamoto’s 
(2005) examination of wage changes in Japan suggests that there was DWNR during 1996-1997 at 
the beginning of the deflation, but wages have been downward flexible since 1998.
15The model is therefore a version of what Mankiw (1994, pp. 292-292) calls the “worker-misperception model,” 
originally due to Friedman (1968). This model provides an explanation for why the aggregate supply curve (the 
relationship between price level and aggregate output) is upward sloping: workers misperceive a rise in the price level 
as an increase in the real wage and increase their labor supply.
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7 Efficiency of the Employment Transaction
Whereas the previous sections of this paper were primarily concerned with positive implications 
of the fairness model, this section discusses some normative implications. Because the wage is set 
in order to influence the worker’s effort rather than to clear the labor market, the model is an 
“efficiency wage” model. It therefore raises the same normative issues for the labor market as a 
whole regarding unemployment as other efficiency-wage models. In this section, I focus attention 
on normative questions regarding the efficiency of the bilateral transaction between the firm and 
the worker. To minimize notation, the formal analysis is restricted to the single-period version of 
the game from Section 5 (i.e., without money illusion).
Following Benjamin (2014), I distinguish between two notions of efficiency for studying interac­
tions when agents have other-regarding preferences. “Material Pareto efficiency” is Pareto efficiency 
with respect to the purely self-regarding component of preferences (the worker’s material payoff 
and the firm’s profit), whereas “utility Pareto efficiency” is Pareto efficiency with respect to the 
overall objective function that the players maximize. In the present context, a transaction (w, e) is 
called m aterial P areto  efficient (M P E ) if there is no alternative transaction (w',er) such that 
u (w0,e0) >  u (w,e) and w (w0,e0) >  w (w,e), at least one inequality strict. A transaction (w,e) 
is called utility P areto  efficient (U P E ) if there is no alternative transaction (w0, e0) such that 
U (w0, e0) >  U (w, e) and w (w0, e0) >  w (w, e), at least one inequality strict. I defer until later in this 
section a discussion of whether MPE or UPE may be the right social welfare criterion. I focus first 
on characterizing under what conditions the equilibria described in previous sections are MPE or
UPE.
A transaction is MPE if and only if =  @^ (w>e)/@w. Because the worker’s material
J  o u ( w ,e ) /o e  o 'K (w ,e )/o e
payoff function and the firm’s profit are quasi-linear in the wage, this equality is equivalent to the 
worker exerting the efficient level of effort, eeff (p); the wage does not matter for material efficiency 
because it is merely a transfer between profit and the worker’s material payoff. Thus, Proposition 
1 immediately implies that in the absence of loss aversion, the equilibrium is MPE.
Proposition 6 shows that, in the absence of loss aversion, the equilibrium is also UPE.
P rop os ition  6. Under Assumptions A and B, if the worker is not loss averse ( A =  1), then for 
any p >  1, the equilibrium transaction is UPE and MPE.
Proposition 6 follows immediately from Proposition 1 and Benjamin’s (2014) Theorem 1. To 
understand why the equilibrium is UPE, first notice that any UPE transaction must maximize
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the sum of surpluses because otherwise it would be utility-Pareto-dominated by an alternative 
transaction that maximized the sum of surpluses, had a higher wage and higher effort, and were 
at least as fair. Among the transactions that maximize the sum of surpluses, relative to the 
equilibrium, the firm would clearly be worse off if the wage were higher, and the worker would be 
worse off if the wage were lower since his material payoff would be lower and the transaction would 
be less fair.
The conclusion that the equilibrium is both MPE and UPE can be extended straightforwardly to 
apply also to the equilibrium of the dynamic game described in Proposition 3. Thus, in the absence 
of loss aversion, gift exchange that is sustained by fairness concerns can be efficient regardless of 
which efficiency notion is used.
This conclusion no longer holds if the worker is loss averse (A >  1). The equilibrium is still 
UPE outside the ranges of wage and effort rigidity— and is MPE only when wage and effort remain 
unchanged from the previous period.
P rop os ition  7. Under Assumption A, if the worker is loss averse ( A >  1) and the firm hires the 
worker in equilibrium, then the equilibrium transaction is UPE if and only if p 2 (ffw rigid )pw-rigid) [  
(p3 rigid’ Pe-rigid) • The equilibrium transaction is also MPE if and only if p =  pw-rigid, or equiva­
lently, if and only if the equilibrium transaction (w*,e*) satisfies w* =  wo and e* =  cq.
Outside the ranges of wage and effort rigidity, the logic for why the equilibrium is UPE is similar 
to the non-loss-averse case. However, if the price realization occurs in ^pw r_ d ,p w-rigid  ^, then there 
is a utility-Pareto improvement: a small reduction in wage and effort that keeps profit constant. 
Because effort is inefficiently high (e* >  eeff (p)) in the region of wage rigidity, the joint reduction 
in wage and effort would increase the worker’s material payoff and (since profit is held constant) 
therefore also utility. Similarly, if the price realization occurs in ( p  ,pe-rigid), then there is a
utility-Pareto improvement. In this case, because effort is inefficiently low (e* <  eeff (p)), a joint, 
small increase in wage and effort that keeps profit constant would increase utility.
Turning to MPE, as noted at the beginning of Section 5.2, the equilibrium level of effort may not 
be eeff (p)— and thus the equilibrium transaction may not be MPE. In fact, Proposition 5 implies 
that the equilibrium effort is the eff cient level of effort only for the unique price realization at which 
w* =  wo and e* =  eo. In the region of wage rigidity, effort is above the efficient level, and in the 
region of effort rigidity, effort is below it. For any other price realization, either (a) w* >  wo and 
e* >  eo, or (b) w* <  wo and e* <  eo. In case (a), the worker suffers a loss in effort but not wage,
and therefore as noted at the beginning of section 5.2, the equilibrium effort satisfies p =  Ac0 (e*)
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and hence is below the efficient level. In case (b), the worker suffers a loss in wage but not effort, 
and therefore the equilibrium effort satisfies p =  c ^  ^ and is above the efficient level.
Is UPE or MPE the more appropriate generalization of Pareto efficiency to use as a welfare 
criterion? UPE is the appropriate generalization if the worker’s utility represents his “true” prefer­
ences, by which I mean what he would choose given correct beliefs and after deliberation. But there 
are a number of reasons why the worker’s behavior— as represented by his utility function— may 
deviate from his true preferences (for related discussion, see Benjamin 2014, Koszegi and Rabin 
2008, and Sen 1973).
In the gift-exchange game studied here, one key question is whether the worker’s fair-minded 
behavior reflects his true preferences, or whether it reflects social norms or reliance on a heuristic 
(modeled in a reduced-form way via the utility specification) that he would reject upon further 
deliberation. For example, aiming to share total surplus equally may be a heuristic that he would 
endorse upon deliberation when interacting with another person but not when interacting with a 
firm. If the worker’s true preference when interacting with a firm coincided with his material payoff, 
then MPE would be the appropriate generalization of Pareto efficiency.
Even if the worker’s fair-minded behavior is a true preference, his loss aversion may be at least 
partially a mistake. For example, loss aversion might reflect an immediate emotional reaction that 
would fade with deliberation. Even if the worker, upon deliberation, would choose to avoid current 
feelings of loss aversion, he might excessively choose to avoid losses under the mistaken belief that 
his current feelings of loss will persist (Loewenstein, O ’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). If loss aversion 
in this context is entirely an error, then the appropriate notion of efficiency is UPE but with the 
worker’s utility calculated without loss aversion.16 (Money illusion is surely an error, even for a 
worker who truly has loss-averse preferences.)
In my view, theoretical reasoning alone cannot resolve the question of what are the worker’s 
“true” preferences— and indeed the answer may differ from one worker to another. The purpose 
of the analysis here is to highlight when and how the answer matters. To shed light on which 
preferences should be used for normative purposes, I believe that empirical evidence must also 
come into play (for related discussion, see Beshears et al 2008). For example, experimental research
16If the worker is loss averse but UPE is defined with respect to the worker’s utility calculated without loss aversion, 
then the equilibrium is UPE if and only if p =  pw-r;g;d. To see why, note that Benjamin’s (2014) Theorem 1 implies 
that, with a non-loss-averse utility function, the equilibrium is UPE only if it is MPE. Proposition 7 states that 
when the worker is loss averse, the equilibrium is MPE only in the special circumstance that p =  pw-r;g;d. Moreover, 
when p =  pw-r;gid, the equilibrium for a loss-averse worker coincides with the equilibrium for a non-loss-averse worker. 
Proposition 6 states that this equilibrium for a non-loss-averse worker is also UPE with respect to the utility of a 
non-loss-averse worker.
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could examine whether and to what extent information or deliberation weaken loss aversion and 
fair-minded behavior. The conclusions from such research could be useful far beyond the specific 
analysis of the firm-worker interaction studied in this paper.
8 Concluding Remarks
The model of fairness concerns explored in this paper— a desire to equalize surplus payoffs judged 
relative to a reference transaction, which is determined by recent personal experience— also may 
explain a wide variety of observations about non-labor markets. For example, consumers may 
wish to punish firms that they believe are trying to extract more surplus from them than usual. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, during temporary periods of high demand, firms often voluntarily 
maintain prices below the market-clearing level, leading to long lines or stockouts (e.g., Rotemberg 
2005, Olmstead and Rhode 1985, Dacy and Kunreuther 1969). Similarly, when costs increase, firms 
typically postpone raising prices. If it becomes clear that the cost increase is permanent and firms 
eventually raise their prices, firms often expend resources to inform customers that their profits 
have taken a hit. In housing markets, rent increases on new tenants are much more common than 
rent increases on existing tenants (Genesove 1999, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986).
The model explored in this paper is purposefully kept as simple as possible in order to make 
transparent the link between the worker’s fairness concerns and the model’s empirical implications. 
However, it is also important to examine more realistic models to investigate to what extent the 
conclusions from the simple model can be generalized.
Throughout the analysis, I have assumed that only workers have a concern for fairness. Results 
would be similar if firms have an analogous concern for fairness (see Benjamin 2014)— at least if the 
worker and the firm share the same reference transaction. In fact, however, disagreements about the 
reference transaction can be important in real-world interactions (indeed, Hart and Moore (2008) 
argue that the potential for such disagreements is a major motivation for contracting). For example, 
when there are several reasonable precedents, negotiators seem able to convince themselves that 
the one most favorable to themselves is the most relevant. This self-serving bias can often cause 
negotiations to break down (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997). Similar problems could arise if only 
one party has fairness preferences, but the selfish party does not know what the fair-minded party 
considers to be the reference transaction.
It would be useful to relax some of the restrictions from Assumption A. As noted in Section 
3, if the worker is allowed to have a weaker dislike of advantageous unfairness, then results in the
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one-period model would be qualitatively similar, except that the equilibrium transaction would not 
be MPE. Allowing the worker to have a weaker dislike of disadvantageous unfairness can lead to a 
qualitatively different outcome, in which the firm exploits the worker’s willingness to altruistically 
provide effort.
Another valuable extension would be to embed the interaction between the firm and the worker 
in a labor market, in which the players’ outside options are determined by the prospects of finding 
another match. Such a model would make it possible to study how aggregate shocks affect aggregate 
wages and unemployment when workers’ loss aversion generates DNWR. Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) 
make progress in this direction.
Other important extensions include allowing the firm to be uncertain about the workers’ pref­
erences (see footnote 1) and making the worker’s effort partially contractible. There has been some 
progress on both of these fronts in closely related models (e.g., Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2007).
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Source: Fehr and Goette (2005, Fig. 3), as calculated from the Swiss Social Insurance 
Files.
Figure 1. The distribution of log-wage changes in Switzerland during 1994, a 
year when the CPI inflation rate was 1.6%. The width of each bin is 0.0083.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Figure 2. A simulated distribution of log-wage changes from the model for cases 
of no loss aversion (Panel A: A =  1) and loss aversion (Panel B: A =  2, a typical 
value in the literature) with the reference transaction in the steady-state case. 
Inflation is set equal to 1.6%: P/P0 =  1.016. Real prices, wages, and the price 
level at the beginning of the year are normalized to 1: p0 = w0 = P0 =  1. Model 
parameters are: ln(p) ~ N (0,1), c(e) = e2/4 , a = 0.8, pD =  1, and pA =  0.5. The 
firm and worker are assumed to always transact, regardless of the price 
realization, as long as the wage is positive. The number of simulation runs 
(including those dropped due to a negative wage) is 10,000. The width of each 
bin is 0.43.
Appendix: Proofs
In  w h at fo llow s, there are several usefu l, a lternative  w ays o f  expressin g  th e  w ork er ’s u tility  w hen  
em p loyed , g iven  here for re ference (for th e  m o d e l w ith  n o  loss aversion  and  n o  m on ey  illu sion ):
UE(w, e) =  au(w, e) +  (1 — a) f  (u(w, e) , ! (w, e; p))
=  ph +  (1 — p )!  +  (JUq
=  (1 — p)pe — pc(e) +  (2 p — 1)w  — (p — o ) uq — (1 — p) i  o,
w here p  2  f p D , p A }.
Lem m a 1. Under A ssu m p tio n  A ,  f o r  any p  >  1, there exists  w (p )  such that:
1. I f  w  <  w (p ) ,  then  e ( w , p )  =  e ( p , w ) .  M oreover ,  e ( p , w )  is increasing in w  and decreasing in
p.
2. I f  w  >  w (p ) ,  then  e ( w ,p )  2  [eeg ( p ) , e ( w , p ) ) , and e ( w , p )  is constan t  in w  and increasing in
p.
P roo f: N ote  th at l r (w ,e ;  p) <  U (w ,e )  is equ ivalent to
c ( e )  +  p e  <  2w  +  i o  ~  u o ■ (1)
F urtherm ore, th e  le ft-h a n d  side is s tr ictly  in creasing  in  e  since C >  0 and  p  >  1. T herefore , 
!~(w, e; p) <  u (w , e )  is equ ivalent to  e  <  e.
T h e  w ork er ’s effort level solves e ( w , p )  =  a r g m a x e U E ( w ,e ;  p ).  S ince U E is k inked  at u =  ! ,  
w h ich  corresp on d s to  e  =  ee, we have
m a x  U E (w , e; p )  =  m a x  -{ m a x (1  — p A )p e  — p A c (e ) ,  m a x (1  — p d )p e  — p d c ( e )  >■
e L e<e e>e J
—V —
(I)
 )
_e
}
(II)
F irst con sid er su b -p rob lem  (II ) , and  define en  to  b e  th e  so lu tion  to  the su b -p rob lem . A ssu m p ­
tio n  A ( i )  states p d  >  1. T h en , on  e  >  e,
d U  E
d e =  (1 -  p d )p  -  p d c ' (e )  <  °-
1
T h a t is, since >  1, U E is s tr ictly  decreasin g  in  e for all e >  e. H ence th e  m a x im u m  is ach ieved  
at en  =  e.
C onsider m a x im iza tion  p rob lem  (I) and  d en ote  b y  ej th e  so lu tion  to  th is su b -p rob lem . In  
particu lar, ej >  0 is g iven  b y  th e  first-order co n d it io n
c ' ( e j ) =  p ------—  >  p
h A
since A (ii )  im plies 1 ^ A >  1. (S ince dJ@U.2 =  ~ ^ A c " ( e ) ,  c "  
co n d it io n  fo r  m a x im iza tion  is satisfied  o n  e >  0 .)
D efine w (p )  b y
(2)
>  0, and  hA  >  0, th e  secon d -ord er
e(p , w (p ))  =  e i . (3)
Since e is in creasing  in  w  (see b e lo w ), for all w  <  w (p ) w e have ej >  e, and  so (I) d oes  n ot have 
a so lu tion  (becau se  th e  o b je c t iv e  fu n ctio n  is str ictly  in creasing  in  e for all e <  e). T h ere fore , if 
w  <  w (p ) ,  th en  th e  w ork er ’ s effort level is th e  so lu tion  from  (II ): e (w ,p )  =  e. I f  w  >  w (p ) ,  th en  (I) 
has so lu tion  eI , w h ich  gives h igher u tility  th a n  th e  so lu tion  to  (II ), ee, since
(1 -  ^ A )p eI -  h A c (e I) >  (1 -  h A ^ e  -  h A c (e )  >  (1 -  h D )p ~ -  h D c (e ) ;
w here th e  first in equ a lity  fo llow s from  eI b e in g  the so lu tion  to  ( I ) , and  th e  secon d  in equ a lity  fo llow s 
from  ^ d  >  h-A. T h ere fore , e (p , w ) =  ep 
Sum m arizing,
{e (w ,p )  if  w  <  w (p ) eI (p ) if  w  >  w (p ).
E q u a tion  (2) show s th at eI is con sta n t in  w  and increasing in  p. B y  th e  d e fin ition  o f  w (p ) , eI(p ) =  
e (w ,p )  w h en  w  =  w (p ), and  since e is in creasing  in  w , eI <  e w h en  w  >  w (p ). N ote  th at eq u a tion  
(2 ), A ( i i ) ,  and  w  >  w (p ) im p ly  th at eI >  eeff(p ). P u ttin g  these inequalities togeth er: w h en  
w  >  w (p ), eI(p ) 2  [e e f f(p ) ,e (w ,p )) .
F inally, analysis o f  eq u a tion  (2 ) w h en  it h olds w ith  equ a lity  show s th at i f  w e increase w , w e m ust 
also in crease e to  ach ieve equality ; i.e ., @ >  0. S im ilarly, in creasing  p  increases th e  le ft-h an d  
side, so e m ust b e  decreased  to  keep equ a lity ; i.e ., @e@w’P) <  0.
□
P rop osition  1. Under Assumptions A and B, for any p >  1, there is a unique equilibrium in 
which the firm hires the worker, and the equilibrium transaction (w*,e*) satisfies -^(w*,e*;p) — 'Kq =  
u(w*, e*) — u q and e* =  eeg(p).
2
P roo f: Recall from Lemma 1 that
e ( w , p )  =
e(w, p) w <  w(p)
ej(p) w >  w(p).
Therefore, the firm’s maximization problem is
m ax^(w ,e(w ,p); p) =  max  ^ max pe(w,p) — w, max peI(p) — w, 0>
w L w<w(p) w>w(p) y
(A) (B)
where (A) and (B) are subject to the employment constraint, U E(w ,e) >  0. The 0 corresponds to 
the firm’s outside option. Let wa and wb denote the solutions to (A) and (B), respectively.
For sub-problem (A), the first-order condition implies
@e(wA ,p) =  1 
dw  p
Moreover, implicitly differentiating equation (2) with equality with respect to w, we have
^ @e(w ,p l d e ( w , p )
c ( e (w ,  p ) ) —  ------+  p —  ------- =  2.
@w @w
Combining, we have C (~(wa , p)) =  p. That is, ~(w a , p) =  eeff(p). To see that the second-order 
condition for a global maximum is satisfied, note that an increase in w increases ee, so c (ee) also 
To maintain the equality, it must be that decreases, hence <  0. It follows thatincreases.
2 2
aWT =  p @w~ <  0. T h ere fore , th e  un iqu e so lu tion  to  (A ) is g iven  b y  eA =  ~(w a  , p ) =  eeff(p) and  w a  
such  th a t -e(w A , eA ) =  7t(w a  , eA ; p ) , w h ich  im plies
c (ee ff(p )) +  peeff(p) -  ^0 +  UQwA = 2 (4)
We now check that both players choose to interact rather than taking their outside options. 
The worker chooses employment whenever UE(w a , eeff(p)) >  0. Since
UE(w a , eeff(p)) =  ctu(wa , eeff) +  (1 -  o) (u(w a , eeff) -  Uo)
=  wa -  c(eeff) -  (1 -  o)uo 
=  c(eeff(p)) +  peeff(p) -  ^0 +  UQ 
=  2 
M  (p) ^o 2o — 1
2 2 2 0
-  c(eeff) -  (1 -  o)uo
accepting the offer is equivalent to (2o — 1)uo — ^o >  —M (p). On the other hand, the firm offers 
the wage only if ^ ( w a ,eeff(p);p) >  0. Since
peeff(p) -  c(eeff(p)) +  ^o -  Uo
^ ( w a , eeff(p)) =  peeff(p) -  w a = 2
3
making the offer is equivalent to uo — Ko <  M (p). Both conditions are implied by Assumption B.
We now check that the candidate solution is in fact an interior solution. Note that w a  <  w(p) 
is equivalent to ej >  ~(w a , p) =  eeff(p), which is guaranteed by A(ii) and c00 >  0 since ej is defined 
by equation (2). Therefore (A) has an interior solution.
Clearly if (B) has no solution, then the solution to (A) is the solution to the maximization 
problem. So suppose (B) has a solution Wb >  w(p). (Note that even though the maximand in 
(B) is strictly decreasing, a solution defined by the employment constraint U E =  0 may exist.) We 
show that in this case, the solution to (A) dominates the solution to (B). Since w a is the solution 
to (A), it must necessarily be the case that
P~(w a , p) — w a  > p e ( w ( p ) , p )  — w (p ) .
Since w(p) is defined by ~(w(p),p) =  ej in equation (3) and Wb >  w (p ), we have
p~(w(p),p) — W(p) =  pej — W(p) >  pej — w b ,
Combining, we see that the solution to (A) dominates the solution to (B) whenever the latter exists.
□
P rop osition  2. At the equilibrium described in Proposition 1:
1. w* and e* are both increasing in p.
2. e* does not depend on uo nor kq.
3. w * is increasing in uo and decreasing in kq.
P roo f: From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that w * is given by equation (4) and e* =
eeff(p). Since eeff(p) is defined by c0(eeff(p)) =  p and since c00 >  0, eeff(p) is increasing in p and is 
constant in both uo and Ko. Given equation (4), w * is clearly decreasing in Ko and increasing in 
uo. Furthermore, since eeff(p) is increasing in p and since c0 >  0, w * is also increasing in p.
□
P rop osition  3. Under Assumptions A0 and B 0, with positive probability there is a unique equilib­
rium in which the firm hires the worker in both periods. The equilibrium transactions, (w * ,e*) for 
t = 1 ,  2, satisfy k (w * , e*;pt) -  Kt~ 1 =  u(w|, e*) -  ut_i and et =  eeff(pt).
4
P roo f: We proceed by backwards induction.
First, note that Assumption A is implied by Assumption A0, and there is positive probability 
that the realized value of p2 satisfies Assumption B. In that case, the equilibrium in period 2 is given 
by Proposition 1, where the reference transactions, ui and k1, are the period-1 outcomes. Since 
M (p) is strictly increasing in p, we can define p* as the smallest value of p that satisfies Assumption 
B for ui and Ki. Assuming from now on that p2 >  p*, e* =  eeg(p2) and K(w*,e*; p2) — Ki =
u(w*, e2) — ui, which imply that
*
w *
c(eeff(p2)) +  p2eeff(p2) -  Ki +  Ui 
2
The resulting profit and utility are
and
K2 * * p2e2 -  w2
* c(eeff(p2)) +  p2eeff(p2) -  Ki +  Ui
p2e2 ------------------------- 2------------------------
M (p2) +  Ki -  Ui 
2
u f CTu(w* ,e2) +  (1 -  a )f (u(w*, e2); K(w*, e2)) 
CTu(w*, e2) +  (1 -  CT)u(w*, e2)
u(w*, e2) — (1 — c)u i 
w* -  c(e2) -  (1 -  CT)ui
c(e2 )+  pe* -  Ki +  ui , *^  M ^
---------------2-------------------c(e2) _  (1 _  CT)ui
M(p2) -  Ki +  (2ct -  1)ui 
2 '
Turning our attention to period 1, we first consider the worker’s optimization problem. For 
p 2 { p a  ; Pd } , the worker’s objective function is given by
Uf  +  EUf  =  p u  +  (1 -  p)Ki +  ctuo +  1 EM (p2) -  2 Ki +  2^ 2 1 ui
2p +  2ct — 1 + 1 — 2p ( )
= ------2--------ui +-------2—  Ki -  (p  -  ct)uo -  (1 -
Rescaling, and noting that wi, uo, Ko, and E M (p2) are constants (with respect to the maximiza-
p )ko +  2 E M  (p2).
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tion), the worker’s maximization problem takes the form
m a x  U f  (w , e) +  E U f  =  m a J  m a x (1  — 2 ^ A )P i e  ~  (2 P a  +  2a  — 1 )c (e ) ,
e e<e
--------------------------------------------------------- V --------------------------------------------------------- }
m
1 )c (e ) j .max(1 — 2 p D )p\e — ( 2 p D +  2 a  — 1)cie>e
------------------------------------------ v---------------------
(ii)
Consider sub-problem (ii) first. Note that A0(i) implies 1 — 2P d <  0 and 2P d +  2a  — 1 >  0. 
Therefore, the worker’s objective function is strictly decreasing on e >  e. Thus, the solution to (ii)
is eii =  e.
For sub-problem (i), A 0(ii) implies 1 — 2p a >  0. if 2p a +  2a — 1 <  0 (i.e., P a <  <  1 since
a >  0), then the maximand of (i) is strictly increasing in e. in that case, (i) has no solution. On 
the other hand, if 2pa +  2a — 1 >  0 (i.e., P a >  1T2ct), then the worker’s first-order condition implies
c '( e i )^ . 1 . 2Pa . P i . (5)
2p  a  +  2a — 1
(The second-order condition is satisfied in this case since 2p a  +  2a — 1 >  0 and c00 >  0.) We 
conclude that the solution to the worker’s problem in period 1 is
ei(w ,p i) =
ei if pa  >  1 22ct and w >  w(pi) 
ee otherwise,
where (as in the proof of Lemma 1) w(p) is defined by e(p, w(p)) =  ei.
We now turn to the firm’s period-1 maximization problem. The firm’s profit is given by
^i +  E'K2 =  ^i +  1 E M (p2) +  2 ^i -  1 ui
3 1 1
=  2 Piei _  2wi +  ^c(ei) +  ^ E M (p2).
Again, since E M (p2) is a constant, we will drop this term from the maximization problems in the 
following.
Case 1. Pa  < 1 ^a. in this case, the worker’s effort level conditional on accepting employment 
is e (regardless of whether w >  w(pi) or w <  w (pi)). Therefore, the firm’s maximization problem 
is
3 1
max ^ i +  E 2^ =  max — pie(w ,p i) — 2w +  — c(e(w ,pi))w w 2 2
3 1
=  max {0 , max — pi~(w, pi) — 2w +  — c (e (w ,p i))l 
w 2 2
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where the 0 is the firm’s outside-option payoff. The first-order condition gives
2Pl +  2 c (e(w ’ P l)^ ^ ^ ^  =  2'
Moreover, differentiating the equation defining the worker’s solution e(w,p 1), tt(w , e; pi) =  u(w, e), 
with respect to w gives
i,~, , .9 e (w,p i) de(w,pi)
c (e(w-p i ) )^ ^ -  + p i^ ^ “  =  2:
These two equations taken together imply c0(e(w ,pi)) =  pi, and so e(w ,pi) =  eeff(pi). The 
optimizing wage equates the surplus payoffs at the efficient level of effort and is given by equation
(4).
Case 2. ^a >  i . In this case, the solution to the worker’s problem depends on whether 
w >  w(pi) or w <  w(pi). Hence the firm’s maximization problem is now
max < 0, max pie(w ,p i) — w, max piei — w >.
L w<w(vi ) w>w(pi ) y
—v —
(A)
w> i )
-V—
(B)
T h e  ca n d id a te  in terior so lu tion  to  su b -p rob lem  (A ) ,  w a , is id en tica l to  th e  p rev iou s case w ith  the 
so lu tion  b e in g  g iven  b y  w a  =  c(eeff(pi))+pie2eff(pi ) - W o .
A s in  th e  p r o o f  o f  P ro p o s it io n  1, th e  m a x im a n d  in  (B ) is str ictly  decreasin g  in  w , b u t a ca n ­
d id a te  so lu tion  is th at th e  w ork er ’ s em p loym en t con stra in t b in ds w ith  equality. H ow ever, even  if  
there exists a so lu tion  to  (B ), w b  >  w ( p i ) ,  th e  so lu tion  to  (A ) dom in ates  it since, reca llin g  that
e (w (p i ) , p i ) =  ep
p ie ( w A ,p i )  -  w a  >  p i e ( w ( p i ) ,p i )  -  w ( p i )  >  p ie i  -  w b .
W e co n c lu d e  th a t th e  un ique ca n d id a te  so lu tion  is th e  so lu tion  to  (A ). N ote  th at th e  so lu tion  
to  (A ) is in terior i f  and  on ly  i f  w a  <  w ( p i ) ,  or  equivalently , ei >  e (w ,p i )  =  eeff(p i) . G iven  
eq u a tion  (5 ), th is is equ ivalent to  ^ a  <  , w h ich  is guaranteed  b y  A ssu m p tion  A 0. H ence
(w ^ ,e i )  =  (w a  ,e e f f(p i)) .
F inally, w e check  th e  firm ’s and  th e  w ork er ’ s em p loym en t con stra in ts . T h e  firm  m akes th e  w age 
offer w hen ever ^ i  +  E-^2 >  0. N ote  th at
3 1 1
^i +  E 2^ =  2piei -  2wi +  2c(ei) +  2E M (p2)
3
=  2piei _  (c (e i) +  piei -  0^ +  c(ei) +  2E M (p2)
piei -  c(ei) +  E M (p2)
2
M  (pi) +  E M  (p2)
+  0^ _  u0
+  0^ _  u0.2
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M  (p i )  +  E M  (p2)
Therefore, the firm makes the wage offer if and only if
Uo -  Ko < 2
T h e  w orker a ccep ts  th e  jo b  offer w hen ever U E +  E U E >  0. N ote  th at
w i — c (e  i ) — (1 — a )u o =
M(pi) -  Ko +  (2a -  1 )u o
tte  ( \ n  \ P ie i ~  c ( e i ) ~  Ko +  Uo n ,U i =  ------------------------------------ (1 — a ) u o
2
2
and
E E M ( p 2 ) -  Ki +  (2 a  -  1)ui E M (p2) -  (p ie i -  w i ) +  (2 a  -  1)(wi -  c(ei))E U  =  ------------  —
2 2
2E M (p 2) -  (p ie i -  c (e i) +  ^o -  uo) +  (2a -  1)(piei -  c(ei) -  ^o +  uo)
4
E M (p 2) -  (1 -  a )M (p i) -  a^o +  auo
S um m ing, we have
tte , vttE a M (p i ) +  E M (p2) -  (1 +  a )^o +  (3 a -  1 )uo
Ui +  E U 2 =  ---------------------------------------2---------------------------------------■
H en ce  th e  w orker a ccep ts  the offer i f  and  o n ly  if
(1 +  a )w  o -  (3 a  -  1 )uo <  a M  (p i )  +  E M  (p i ) :
B o th  o f  these con d ition s  are gu aranteed  b y  A ssu m p tion  B 0.
□
2
P rop osition  4. A t  the equilibrium described in P rop os it ion  3: f o r  t  =  1, 2,
1. w l and e\ are both increasing in p t .
2. e l does n o t  depend on  uo n o r  'Ko.
3. w l is increasing in uo and decreasing in Ko.
P roo f: T h e  result has a lready  b een  p roven  fo r  t =  2 in  P ro p o s it io n  2. S ince w\ is g iven  b y
eq u a tion  (4 ), it is in creasing  in  p i  and  u o , and  decreasin g  in  Ko. O n  th e  o th er  h and , e\ =  eeff(p i) , 
and  so it is in d ep en den t o f  b o th  uo and  Ko, and  is in creasing  in  p i.
□
Lem m a 2. Under A ssu m p tio n  A ,  i f  A >  1, then  f o r  any p  >  1, there exists a w (p )  such that f o r  
w o <  w ( p ) :
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lim de(w,p)
1. Effort responds more to wage cuts than to wage increases: . wlw° ge@W,P) > 1­
2. Effort is more responsive to wage changes when effort is below the reference level of effort
]im 9e(W,p)
than when effort is below it: — e|e° de9(f p) > 1.
]ime#e° —k r 1
If wo >  w(p), then e(w,p) is constant in w.
P roo f: By an analogous argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, on w <  w(p), e(w,p) =  e(w,p), 
where e(w,p) is defined by u(w, e) =  7r(w, e). Difierentiating with respect to w:
de
dw
2
p+c'(e)
2
p+Ac'(e)
1+A
p+c'(e)
1+A
p+Ac'(e)
w >  wo, e <  eo, 
w >  w0, e >  e0, 
w <  w0, e <  e0, 
w <  w0, e >  e0-
Since A >  1 and c! >  0, the results of the lemma follow immediately. For w0 >  w(p), a similar 
argument as in the proof of Lemma 1 implies that e(w, p) is constant in w.
□
P rop osition  5. Under Assumption A, if the firm hires the worker in equilibrium, then the 
equilibrium (w*,e*) is unique almost surely. Moreover:
1. If p 2 ^pw rigid,pw-rigid ), then w* =  w0, e* >  e0 , and e* is strictly decreasing in p.
2. If p 2 rigid, pe-rigid^, then e* =  e0, w* >  w0, and w* is strictly increasing in p.
3. If p is outside the above ranges, then w* and e* are both strictly increasing in p.
P roo f: Consider the steady-state case: c0(e0) =  p0. If p =  p0, then clearly w* =  w0 and e* =  e0.
For p <  p0, the firm has two options: w <  w0 or w >  w0. Consider first w >  w0. Since the 
worker chooses efiort to equalize the surpluses, it must be that e >  e0 since p <  p0 and w >  w0. 
To see this, recall that the equalizing level of efiort is given by
w — 0c(e) — w0 +  0c(e0) =  pe — w — p0e0 +  w0
for 6 2 f1, Ag, depending on whether or not e >  e0. Rearranging and using the fact that w >  w0 
and p0 >  p,
6(c(e) -  c(e0)) =  2(w -  w0) +  p0e0 -  pe >  p0(e0 -  e).
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Since c 0 >  0, th is ca n  on ly  h o ld  for e >  eo. N ow  L em m a  2 im plies th a t JW =  p+Ac'(e) • N ote  that 
th e  p ro fit k  (w , e (w ))  =  p e  — w  is in  fa ct decreasin g  in  w  since
d'K d e  p  — Ac0(e)
d w  p @w  p  +  Ac0(e)
T h e  final in equ a lity  fo llow s from  th e  fa ct th at c 0(e ) >  c 0(eo ) =  po >  p  and  A >  1. T hu s th e  firm ’s
so lu tion  o n  w  >  wo is w* =  wo, and  e* is defined  b y
A c(e* ) +  pe* =  poeo +  A c(eo ). (6)
T urn ing  to  w  <  w o , we n ow  have e <  eo using a sim ilar argum ent as b e fore . B y  L em m a 2, 
JW =  p+c'(e) • T h ere fore , JW =  • T h e  first-ord er co n d it io n  im plies c0(e* ) =  Ap. H ow ever, we
requ ire  e <  eo, or  equ ivalently , c0(e ) <  c 0(eo ) =  po. T h erefore , for p  2  (p p ,p o ) , th e  m a x im iza tion  
p rob lem  has n o  so lu tion . I f  p  <  P0, th en  th e  so lu tion  is g iven  b y  c0 (e* ) =  Ap, and  w* is the w age 
such  th a t th e  surpluses are equalized :
pe* -  poeo +  (1 +  A)wo +  c (e* ) -  c (eo )
w =
1 +  A
Since c0 (e*) =  Ap, we k n ow  th at e* <  eo, and  thus w* =  wo +  —— <  wope* —pp e0+c(e*)-c(e0)1+A
W e con c lu d e  as fo llow s: in  th e  stea d y -sta te  case w ith  p  2  (pp ,p o ) , w* =  wo and  e* >  eo is 
defined  b y  eq u a tion  (6 ). A na lysis  o f  eq u a tion  (6 ) show s th at e* m ust b e  decreasin g  in  p  since the 
r igh t-h an d  side is con stan t and  th e  le ft-h a n d  side is s tr ictly  in creasing  in  e. For p  <  Pp, e* <  eo and 
w* <  wo are s tr ictly  in creasing  in  p. D en otin g  p ro fit w h en  th e  firm  sets th at w age b y  K <Wp (p ) and 
p ro fit w h en  th e  firm  sets w age wo b y  KWp (p ), n o te  th a t b eca u se  b o th  fu n ction s are con tin u ou s in  
p, Kwp (pp) =  K <wp (P p ). T h e  firm  is th ere fore  indifferent, and  thus th e  equ ilib riu m  is n on -un ique, 
w h en  th e  p rice  rea liza tion  is e x a ctly  Pp.
For p  >  po, th e  firm  again  has th e  sam e tw o op tion s : w  <  wo or w  >  wo. C on sid er first w  <  wo. 
A s b e fore , it m ust b e  th e  case th at e <  eo . JW =  p + 'iN ). H en c^  @W =  >  0 since
e <  eo im plies c0(e ) <  c 0(eo) =  po <  p  and  A >  1. T h a t is, p ro fit is s tr ictly  in creasing  in  w age and 
so there is n o  so lu tion  for  w  <  wo.
N ow  con sid er w  >  wo. W e analyze three subcases: (a ) w  =  wo, (b ) w  >  wo and  e <  eo, and 
(c ) w  >  wo and  e >  eo. For (a ), since p  >  po, it m ust b e  th a t e <  eo since the w orker ch ooses 
effort to  equalize  th e  surplus payoffs. T hu s fo r  b o th  (a ) and  (b ) , w e have th at JW- =  p+C/(e) >  0 
since c 0(e ) <  c 0(eo ) =  po <  p. B ut th is im plies th a t e >  eo, a con tra d ict ion . T hu s w e k n ow  th at if  
w  >  w o , th en  we are in  case (c ).
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For (c), =  p+Ac'(e) • The firm’s first-order condition thus implies c0(e) =  ^ . Since we are on
the domain e >  eo, or equivalently, c0(e) >  c0(eo) =  po, for p <  Apo, we have a corner solution, 
e* =  eo. Since the wage is such that the surpluses are equalized, it must be increasing in p since 
profit is increasing in p, and effort and thus utility are otherwise constant. For p >  Apo, the solution 
is given by C (e*) =  ^ and the wage w* that equalizes the surpluses:
w* =  pe* _  poeo +  2wo +  Ac(e*) -  Ac(eo)
W =  2 ‘
Clearly e* and w* are both increasing in p since c0 >  0 and c00 >  0.
Now consider the recent-increase case: po =  Ac0(eo). Define poo =  p 0. Then the previous 
analysis applies to poo =  c0(eo). That is, for p 2  (P00 , poo) =  ^^2 , , w* =  wo, and e* >  eo is
decreasing in p. For p 2  (poo,Apoo) =  (p0 ,p o ), e* =  eo, and w* >  wo is increasing in p. For all
other p, w* and e* are increasing in p.
Finally, the recent-decrease case: Apo =  c0(eo). Similarly to above, define poo =  Apo, and apply 
the steady-state-case result to poo =  c0(eo). That is, for p 2  (P p-,poo) =  (po,Apo), w* =  wo, and 
e* >  eo is decreasing in p. For p 2  (poo, Apoo) =  (Apo, A2po), e* =  eo, and w* >  wo is increasing in 
p. For all other p, w* and e* are increasing in p.
□
P rop osition  6. Under Assumptions A and B, if the worker is not loss averse ( A =  1), then for 
any p >  1, the equilibrium transaction is UPE and MPE.
P roo f: By Proposition 1, e* =  ~(w*,e*) =  eeff(p). Therefore, the equilibrium is MPE. Since we 
are in the case of no loss aversion,
UE =  ^(w — c(e)) +  (1 — /u)(pe — w) +  auo,
w here p  2  { P d  , h A }- T hu s fo r  each  ^ ,
@U /@ w  p  — (1 — p )
@U /@ e  —p c 0(e) +  (1 — p )p
Since c0 (e*) =  c 0(eeff(p ))  =  p,
lim
(w,e)!(w* ,e
@U/@w 
*) @U/@e
2p -  1 
(1 -  2p)p
- 1
p ’
Moreover, since 'K =  pe — w,
9^ /9w  —1
@K/@e p
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Since @U/ dw dU/ de
dn/dw 
d'n/de , (w* e*) is U P E .
□
P r o p o s i t i o n  7 . Under A ssu m p tio n  A , i f  the w ork er  is loss averse  ( A >  1 )  and the f i rm  hires the 
w ork er  in equilibrium, then  the equilibrium transaction  is U P E  i f  and only  i f  p  2  ( p w rigid , p w-rigid ) [  
( f r i g i d , p e-rigid) • The equilibrium transaction  is also M P E  i f  and on ly  i f  p  =  p w-rigid, o r  equiva­
lently, i f  and on ly  i f  the equ ilibrium  transaction  (w *, e *) satisfies  w * =  wo and  e* =  eo.
P r o o f :  W e first show  th at (w *, e*) is n ot U P E  fo r  p  2  (p w rigid, Pw-rigid) =  ( p y  , p o o ) . P ro p o s it io n  5 
im plies th a t w * =  w o, e* >  eo, and  c 0 (e* ) >  c0(eo) =  poo >  p. L et A  >  0 b e  sm all en ou gh  so that 
e! =  e * — A  >  eo and  define (w 0, e0) =  (w * — p A , e* — A )  so th at
k (w0, e0) =  p e 0 — w 0 =  p  (e* — A )  — (w * — p A )  =  p e * — w * =  k (w*, e*).
S ince c  is con v ex  and  c 0(e 0) >  c0(eo) >  p,
c (e *) =  c (e 0 +  A )  >  c (e 0) +  c0(e 0) A  >  c (e 0) +  p A .
T h ere fore , th e  w ork er ’ s ch ange in  w age is w 0 — w * =  — p A , and  th e  ch ange in  th e  cost o f  effort is 
c (e 0) — c  (e *) <  —p A . It fo llow s th a t u (w 0, e0) — u (w *, e*) >  0. S ince th e  firm ’s p ro fit is u nchanged , 
it m ust b e  th a t U  (w 0, e 0) >  U  (w *, e *). T hu s (w *, e *) is n ot U P E .
W e n ow  show  th at (w *, e *) is n ot U P E  for p  2  (p e rigid, p e-rigid) =  (poo,A poo). P ro p o s it io n  5 
im plies th at e * =  eo and  w * >  wo. L et A  >  0 b e  sm all en ou gh  so th a t c 0 (e * +  A )  <  p  (this is 
p oss ib le  since c0 (e*) =  poo <  p  and  c0 is con tin u ou s), and  define (w 0, e 0) =  (w * +  p A , e* +  A )  so 
th a t k (w 0, e0) =  k (w *, e *). A ga in , since c  is con vex ,
c (e *) =  c (e 0 — A )  >  c (e 0) — c 0(e 0) A  >  c (e 0) — p A
since c 0(e 0) <  p. T hu s, th e  w ork er ’s change in  w age is w 0 — w * =  p A , and  his ch ange in  th e  cost o f  
effort is c (e 0) — c (e *) <  p A . W e th en  have th a t u (w 0, e0) — u (w *, e*) >  0. S ince th e  firm ’s p ro fit is 
u n ch an ged , it m ust b e  th a t U  (w 0, e 0) >  U (w *, e *). T hu s (w *, e *) is n ot U P E .
T h ere  are three m ore  cases to  consider: (1 ) p  >  p e-rigid, (2) p  <  p w rigid , and  (3) p  =  p w-rigid. W e 
analyze each  in  turn.
C ase (1 ) .  F rom  th e  p r o o f  o f  P ro p o s it io n  5, w e k n ow  th at in  th is case, w * >  wo, e* >  eo, and 
c 0 (e *) =  p /A . T h ere fore ,
@U /@ w  2 p  — 1 2 p  — 1 1
9 U /9 e  —p A c0 (e*) +  p (1  — p )  —p p  +  p (1  — p ) p
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Since (as in  th e  p r o o f  o f  P ro p o s it io n  6) @^=@w =  _ p as w ell, (w *, e*) is U P E .
C ase (2 ) .  F rom  th e  p r o o f  o f  P ro p o s it io n  5, w e k n ow  th at in  th is case, w* <  w o , e* <  eo , and 
c ' (e*) =  Ap. T h erefore ,
dU /dw  (1 +  A )p  — 1 (1 +  A )p  — 1 1
d U / d e  —p c ' (e* ) +  p (1  — p ) —pA p +  p (1  — p ) p
T hu s, as b e fore , (w * ,e * )  is U P E .
C ase (3 ) . F rom  th e  p r o o f  o f  P ro p o s it io n  5, w e k n ow  th at in  th is case, w* =  w o , e* =  eo , and 
c '( e o) =  p. For con tra d ict ion , su ppose  there exists ( w ', e ')  th a t u tility -P a re to  dom in ates  (w * ,e * ) . 
D efine A e and  A w b y  e ' =  eo +  A e and  w ' =  w o +  A w . S ince ^ (w ',  e ')  >  ^ (w o , eo), w e k n ow  that 
A w <  p A e , and  since ( w ', e ' ) is a u tility -P a re to  im p rovem en t, we k n ow  th at s g n (A w) =  s g n (A e). 
B elow , we w ill use th e  fo llow in g  result: S ince c  is con vex ,
c (e ')  =  c (e o +  A e ) >  c (e o) +  c '( e o)A e  =  c (e o) +  p A e .
T h ere  are three su b -cases to  con sider: (a) A e >  0, (b ) A e <  0, and  (c ) A e =  0. S tarting  w ith  
su b -case  (a ), th e  w orker is exp erien cin g  a loss in  th e  effort d om a in  since A e >  0 and  a gain  in  the 
w age d om a in  since A w >  0. T hus,
U (w ', e ')  — 7r(w ', e ')  =  2 w ' — 2w o — p e ' +  p eo — A c(e ') +  A c(eo)
<  2 (w o +  A w ) -  2w o -  p (e o +  A e ) +  p eo -  A (c (e o) +  p A e ) +  A c(eo)
=  2A w  -  p A e  -  A pA e <  (2 -  (1 +  A ))p A e  <  0,
and therefore the worker is in the region of disadvantageous unfairness. Dropping the uo and ^o 
terms in the worker’s utility,
U(w', e') =  Pd (w' — Ac(e')) +  (1 — pD) (pe' — w')
=  (2Pd -  1)w' -  aPd c(e' ) +  (1 -  Pd )pe'
< (2Pd _  1)(wo +  A w ) _  APd (c(eo) +  pA e) +  (1 _  Pd )p(eo +  A e )
<  (2pD _  1)wo _  p D c(eo) +  (1 _  p D )peo +  (2pD _  1)A w +  (1 _  p D _  ApD )pA e
< (2pd  -  1)wo -  Pd c(eo) +  (1 -  Pd )peo 
=  U(wo, eo).
B ut th is con tra d icts  th e  h ypoth esis  th a t ( w ', e ' ) u tility -P a re to  dom in ates  (w o ,e o ) .
N ow  con sid er su b -case  (b ) , A e <  0. S ince A w <  0, th e  w orker is exp erien cin g  a loss in  th e  w age 
d om ain . S ince c (e ')  — c (e o ) >  p A e >  A w , we k n ow  th at u (w ', e ') — u (w o , eo ) =  A w — (c (e ')  — c (e o ) )  <
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0 , w ith  strict in equ a lity  if  A w < p A e . S u pp ose  first th at A w =  p A e . T h e n  f (w 0,e0) =  f(w o ,eo ) , 
and  so f (w 0,e0) =  f  (wo,eo). T hu s, fo r  p 2 {p a ,Pd } ,
U(w0, e0) =  pu(w0, e0) +  (1 — p)fr(w0, e0) +  auo
=  p(u(w 0, e0) -  uo) +  (1 -  p )f(w o, e o) +  auo 
<  p(u(wo, eo) -  uo) +  (1 -  p )f(w o, eo) +  auo 
=  pu(w o, eo) +  (1 -  p )f (w o, e o) +  auo =  U (wo, eo).
T h ere fore  (w0,e0) ca n n ot u tility -P a re to  d om in a te  (wo,eo), a con tra d ict ion . N ow  su p p ose  A w < 
pA e . T h e n  since f  (w0, e0) >  f(w o ,eo ) , u (w0, e0) <  u(wo,eo), and  (wo,eo) is a surp lus-equalizing  
tra n sa ction , it m ust b e  th a t th e  w orker is in  th e  d isad van tageou sly -u n fa ir  region . Furtherm ore, 
f (w 0,e0) >  f  (wo, eo) im plies th at f (w 0,e0) >  f(w o, eo) . S ince Pd — 1 (from  A ( i ) ) ,
U(w0, e0) =  Pd u(w0, e0) +  (1 — Pd ) f (w 0, e0) +  auo
< p d (u(w0, e0) -  uo) +  (1 -  Pd )f(w o, eo) +  auo
< p d (u(wo, eo) -  uo) +  (1 -  Pd )f(w o, eo) +  auo
=  p d u(wo, eo) +  (1 -  Pd )f(w o, eo) +  auo =  U(wo, eo).
A ga in , th is con tra d icts  th e  h ypoth esis  th a t (w0, e0) u tility -P a re to  dom in ates  (wo,eo).
L ast, we tu rn  to  su b -case  (c ) , A e =  0. S ince A w < pA e , w e kn ow  th at either A w < 0 or  A w =  0. 
B ut th e  la tter  is im p ossib le  beca u se  th en  p rofit and  u tility  w ou ld  b e  u nch an ged  (con tra d ictin g  U P E ), 
so A w < 0 . S ince A e =  0 and A w < 0 , th e  w orker is in  th e  reg ion  o f  d isadvan tageou s unfairness. B ut 
th en  a decrease  in  th e  w age redu ces utility, so U(w0,e0) <  U(wo, eo), con tra d ic t in g  th e  h ypoth esis  
th a t (w0, e0) u tility -P a re to  dom in ates  (wo,eo). W e con c lu d e  th at in  case (3 ), (w*,e*) =  (wo, eo) is 
U P E .
Finally, we con sid er w h en  th e  equ ilib riu m  is M P E , i.e ., w h en  c0(e) =  p . A cco rd in g  to  P ro p o s it io n  
5, th is o n ly  o ccu rs  w h en  p =  poo and (w*, e*) =  (wo, eo).
□
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